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Abstract
Medicaid and Medicare are two major public programs that help vulnerable groups of people to
gain coverage of health care services. There are various ongoing debates on the Medicaid- and
Medicare-related issues. Among those, some topics draw most of attentions.
First of all, how do we contain cost of Medicaid programs? In the 90’s, Medicaid expenditures
grew fast. In response to this, many states began to enroll large numbers of Medicaid patients in
managed care programs. The first chapter examines the effect of Pennsylvania Medicaid manda-
tory HMO program, HealthChoices program on the outcomes of pregnant women. I utilize the
Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council inpatient data file and American Hospital
Association survey data to perform difference-in-difference-in-difference estimation and find ro-
bust results indicating that HealthChoices program helps Medicaid mothers reduce the incidence
of preventable complications, utilization of C-section procedure and decrease the delivery charge.
Second, how do we improve the access to a certain health care service. In January 2006,
Medicare introduced a new prescription drug benefit through Part D, therefore lowering the out-
of-pocket cost of prescription drug for Medicare beneficiaries. The second chapter uses data from
the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS), Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS) and the National Inpatient Sample from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project
(NIS-HCUP) 2002-2004 and 2006-2009 and a difference-in-discontinuity approach to estimate the
differential discrete jumps in outcomes at 65 years old for the sample after 2006 and before 2006.
We find a 33% increase in the number of prescription drugs and a 55% increase in the number of
generic drugs prescribed in physicians’ offices for each visit following policy implementation. We
also find the existence of anticipatory effects for prescribing patterns before the adoption of Part
D. We do not find evidence that Part D resulted in significant changes in medical expenditures
1
2for other services or inpatient health outcomes.
Last but not the least, how do we assure the quality of health care for vulnerable groups of
people while containing costs of the program? Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services started
“the Medicaid/CHIP Quality Initiative”, and promoting Pay-for performance (P4P) program for
Medicaid managed care plans as a part of this initiative. The third chapter studied the effect
of Medicaid managed care P4P programs on the use of preventive care services and the different
effectiveness of P4P incentive designs. We used data from the National Health Interview Sur-
vey (NHIS), and the National Immunization Survey (NIS). Results suggested that among those
on Medicaid, state adoption of a P4P program is positively associated with the likelihood that
adults have received mammograms, blood pressure checks and Pap smear tests. P4P adoption
is also associated with increases in the probability that children on Medicaid are up-to-date on
the Haemophilus influenza type B vaccine, the 4:3:1, and the 4:3:1:3:3 vaccine series, respectively.
These average effect sizes are larger in states with higher Medicaid managed care penetration
rates and in states that use negative financial incentives, such as withholds and penalties, rather
than states with positive financial incentives and non-financial incentives.
Chapter 1
The Pennsylvania HealthChoices
Program
Pregnancy Outcomes for Medicaid Patients in
Mandatory Managed Care
1.1 Introduction
The literature on Medicaid managed care is now substantial, but has not reached a clear conclusion
as to whether managed care can achieve the same or better health outcomes more efficiently than
traditional fee-for-service (FFS) reimbursement systems. Given that one in five Americans now
relies on Medicaid to pay for healthcare and that many states have turned to managed care as
a strategy to control costs, determining the net impact of managed care on care utilization and
on health outcomes for Medicaid enrollees is vital.1 However, measuring this impact is difficult
because a number of confounding factors may bias estimates of managed care’s effect. In this paper
we take advantage of Pennsylvanian’s staggered adoption of mandatory managed care and use
difference-in-difference (DD) and difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) methods to study
its effect on health care and outcomes for pregnant Medicaid patients.
Pennsylvania began implementing its mandatory managed care program, HealthChoices, when
it received a 1915(b) waiver from the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA, now known
1See http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-State/By-State.html.
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as Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services or CMS) in 1997. Although Pennsylvanian’s move
to managed care had as explicit goals both efficiency and preservation of the quality of care, im-
plementation of HealthChoices raised concerns among advocates for low-income Pennsylvanians.
2 The dual goals may be achieved if managed care can provide the same or better care at lower
cost, but it is also possible that the incentives created by HealthChoices will cause managed care
organizations to reduce costs by reducing the quality of care.
Under traditional FFS reimbursement programs, patients may seek covered services from any
physician or hospital that participates in the Medicaid program, and providers are reimbursed by
the state for the services provided according to a schedule of fees. FFS reimbursement thus gives
physicians and hospitals an incentive to provide unnecessary services. Managed care comes in a
variety of types, but the classic arrangement, and the focus of our interest, is care that is managed
by a health maintenance organization (HMO). In this type of managed care, the state pays the
HMO a flat fee for each Medicaid patient that the HMO enrolls (premia may be risk-adjusted
to reflect the greater costs associated with specific patients). The HMO in turn identifies and
reimburses the physicians and hospitals that its enrollees may use. The flat fee paid by the state
gives the HMO an incentive to reduce the reimbursements it pays to doctors and hospitals for
patient care.
HMOs pursue lower costs by reimbursing the providers in their networks on a capitated basis,
giving the doctors and hospitals an incentive to eliminate unnecessary services. Further, HMOs
may reduce costs and achieve better health outcomes by providing more preventive and more coor-
dinated care to patients that may be ill-informed about recommended health measures. However,
HMOs may also reduce costs by restricting provision of necessary care, a strategy that will also
be more effective if patients are ill-informed.
We study these issues by examining the impact of Pennsylvania’s switch to mandatory man-
aged care on health and cost outcomes for pregnant women. Much of the literature on managed
care and Medicaid examines the experiences of pregnant women and their babies. Pregnant
Medicaid beneficiaries often lack a regular source of early and comprehensive prenatal care, and
2Both Pennsylvanian’s Department of Public Welfare (DPW) and the federal government had these goals in
mind. HCFA approved 1915 (b) waivers under the condition that states receiving the waiver demonstrate that
their proposed program was “cost-effective and efficient” but also that its restrictions of Medicaid beneficiaries’
choices not “substantially impair access to covered services of adequate quality where medically necessary.”
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have substantial rates of smoking and substance abuse, and may therefore be more likely to have
pregnancy-related complications that place their health and their babies’ health at risk, increasing
the cost of their care (Goldfarb et al., 1991). Managed care plans have the potential to provide
more comprehensive prenatal care to these women, encouraging healthy behaviors during preg-
nancy that reduce the chances of complications and help to identify potential problems before
delivery. We measure the impact of Pennsylvania’s managed care program on both health out-
comes and utilization of care by measuring its effect on the rate of preventable complications, on
the rate of Cesarean sections (C-sections), and on the total cost of hospital admissions associated
with each pregnancy.
Managed care is rarely implemented for a random selection of Medicaid patients, so estimates
of its effects based on comparing outcomes for patients covered by managed care to outcomes for
those who are (or were) not may be biased by self-selection, by the influence of contemporaneous
trends, or by heterogeneity among patient populations or individual patients (see Levinson &
Ullman, 1998, for a succinct summary). However, in Pennsylvania the new managed care program
was mandatory, reducing the bias that self-selection might otherwise introduce. Second, the state
introduced managed care for Medicaid patients at different times for different regions, allowing us
to use DD to net out the effects of contemporaneous changes that may be affecting all Medicaid
patients, not just those subject to the policy change. Third, we use changes in the outcomes of
commercially-insured mothers to net out any common shocks that may be affecting all mothers,
whether Medicaid or commercially-insured, and so are not due to the effects of the policy change.
Finally, we control for the potentially confounding effects of heterogeneity among mothers arising
from differences in their health behaviors or attitudes by using mother fixed effects, thus measuring
the impact of the policy change by measuring changes in outcomes for women who gave birth
more than once during the study period.
Our results show that in Pennsylvania managed care is associated with a lower rate of pre-
ventable complications, a result that is robust to changes in the specifications. We also find that
the reduction in preventable complications is greater for high risk mothers, while at the same
time the probability of these mothers receiving a C-section is higher, results suggesting that bet-
ter overall health outcomes may have been achieved through more intensive care of higher risk
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patients. Finally, we find some evidence suggesting that these beneficial health outcomes are
eventually matched by reductions in costs, although cost reductions take several years to develop.
The plan of the paper is as follows. We briefly review the literature in section 2, and explain
how our paper contributes to the research, and in section 3 we then describe the implementation
of HealthChoices in Pennsylvania in greater detail. In section 4 we explain our empirical strategy
and describe our specifications. Section 5 discusses our data sources, our sample, and the variables
used in the estimations, and we present the estimation results and robustness checks in section 6.
We consider the possible effects of patient health status and of adjustment lags in section 7, and
we conclude in section 8.
1.2 Literature Review
Most studies of the impact of Medicaid managed care use data from birth certificates on the health
outcomes for infants delivered by women who are, or who, because of their income and education
levels are likely to be, enrolled in Medicaid. In a number of papers the birth certificate files
are linked to Medicaid files, giving researchers a way to connect Medicaid claims, for example for
prenatal care, to the outcomes for infants. Researchers usually have information about the mother
(age, race, income, sometimes education and marital status), and a few also have some controls for
the quality of the hospital where the delivery takes place (e.g., whether the hospital is a teaching
hospital; whether there is a neonatal intensive care unit). Many therefore examine whether,
controlling for mother and some hospital characteristics, managed care improved utilization of
prenatal care and/or improved health outcomes, usually the incidence of low birth weight babies
(Goldfarb et al., 1991; Carey et al., 1991; Kreiger et al., 1992; Shulman, 1997; Levinson and
Ullman 1998; Oleske et al. 1998; Griffin et al., 1999; Moreno, 1999; Conover et al., 2001; Koroukian
et al. 2001; Tai-Seale et al. 2001; Howell et al, 2004; Kenney et al., 2005; Sommers et al., 2005,
Aizer, et al., 2007). In some papers, changes in the rate of C-sections (Carey et al., 1991; Moreno,
1999; Koroukian, 2001) or changes in expenditures (Tai-Seale et al, 2001; Duggan, 2004) are
examined.
Despite similarities in the data analyzed in these papers, they differ in important ways. First,
studies of the impact of managed care are necessarily done at the state level, and the states
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examined differ in the types of managed care arrangements they instituted (e.g., owner-type,
degree of competition), in their prior experience with managed care for Medicaid patients, and in
how quickly the new programs were implemented, all of which may have affected the performance
of these plans.3 Further, some states expanded eligibility for Medicaid for pregnant women at the
same time as they were implementing managed care.
Second, papers differ in the stringency with which they are able to control for potentially
confounding factors. For example, some studies compare outcomes of Medicaid women before
and after managed care is adopted state-wide (Griffin et al., 1999; Moreno, 1999). However,
their results may be affected by the influence of contemporaneous changes not related to the
implementation of managed care: for example, changes in prenatal care use after managed care
implementation could be due to shifts in the composition of the population, or to changes in the
quality of care for all patients in the area because of new practice patterns or technology.
Other studies compare outcomes for Medicaid patients enrolled in managed care to those
enrolled in FFS systems during the same period (Krieger et al., 1992; Goldfarb et al. 1991;
Levinson and Ullman 1998; Koroukian et al. 2001; Carey et al., 1991; Oleske et al. 1998; Tai-
Seale et al. 2001). These studies mostly rely on managed care being mandatory, or the result of
administrative selection, to control for biases that would be introduced if patients were free to
choose whether to enroll in managed care: for example, sicker women may be more likely to choose
FFS over managed care if they have a choice. However, these papers are comparing outcomes for
different groups of women, frequently in different counties: counties might have different economic
and other conditions that may be correlated with the health status of their Medicaid patients.
A few studies adopt the DD strategy we use in this paper, comparing changes in outcomes
for patients that switch to managed care to changes in outcomes for those that remain in a FFS
control group (Conover et al., 2001; Sommers, et al., 2005). This strategy differences out the
common trend experienced by both control and treatment groups, such as parity risk or changes
in medical practice standards.4 One such paper, in this case a study of outcomes in counties
3Kaestner et al. (2005) is an exception: they use a national sample of birth certificates to study the impact of
managed care. Their approach allows them to analyze a large sample, but they must use proxies for a mother’s
insurance status because the birth certificates do not contain insurance information.
4This approach is subject to the criticism that the policy itself might be endogenous in that there may be
social or political reasons why some counties use managed care program while others remain with FFS. If these
socio-political circumstances are correlated with the health of their citizens, the results will be biased. We are less
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with mandatory as opposed to voluntary managed care (Kenney et al., 2005), also includes a
DDD estimation that uses commercially-insured mothers to control for factors that might affect
all mothers, whether in the Medicaid program or not.
Finally, two studies attempt to control for the effects of heterogeneity in individual mothers
that may be affecting outcomes by focusing only mothers that give birth before and after the
switch to managed care. Howell et al. (2004) compare changes in outcomes for women that
remained in FFS to those that switched from FFS to managed care using a sample of Medicaid
enrollees that gave birth twice within a five year period. Aizer et al. (2007) uses mother fixed
effects, estimating the impact of managed care by changes in the outcomes for women that gave
birth before and after the regime change.
Perhaps as a result of both the different states studied and the different empirical approaches
employed, the evidence about the impact of managed care is mixed. A number of studies found
some differences in prenatal care but no difference in the birth weight for infants between Medicaid
patients using managed care and those in FFS systems (Goldfarb et al., 1991; Carey et al., 1991;
Kreiger et al., 1992; Levinson & Ullman, 1998; Duggan, 2004; Howell et al, 2004; Kenney et al;
2005; Sommers et al., 2005). Others found that health outcomes were worse (Oleske et al, 1998;
Conover et al., 2001). In one disturbing study, managed care was associated with lower quality
prenatal care and increases in the incidence of low birth weight, prematurity, and neonatal death
(Aizer et al., 2007). C-section rates appeared to be either unaffected by managed care (Carey
et al., 1991; Oleske et al., 1998; Koroukian et al., 2001) or reduced in some cases (Howell et al,
2005).
In this paper we use hospital in-patient records from Pennsylvania rather than birth cer-
tificates and Medicaid files to generate our outcome variables. The in-patient records contain
detailed information about a mother’s health status, her delivery experience, charges for any
hospital stays during her pregnancy and delivery, and her insurance status, but do not contain
information about prenatal care, nor about infant outcomes. We therefore use the occurrence
of preventable complications as our measure of health outcome, the occurrence of C-section as
concerned about this problem because in Pennsylvania the original plan was for Medicaid patients in all counties
to be switched to managed care, and the order in which different regions adopted managed care seems mostly to
have been driven by population, with the most populous regions converting first.
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a measure of utilization, and the information about hospital charges to develop a measure of
cost. Using inpatient records for Medicaid patients in a number of counties over a 10 year period
provides us with a much larger sample of pregnancies than most studies to estimate the effects of
managed care, which may be small. Using these records also allows us to link patient outcomes
to information about the hospital where the birth took place so that we can include more controls
for variations in a hospital’s quality and its competitive situation.
1.3 HealthChoices
Pennsylvania obtained permission from HCFA to require Medicaid recipients to use an HMO
for their health care in January 1997, and almost immediately began a phased implementation of
HealthChoices, its new mandatory managed care program. In this program, which is administered
by the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (DPW), Medicaid patients are provided with
a choice of several HMOs, and each must select an HMO to manage their healthcare, or, if they
have not done so, they are randomly assigned to one. (The state hired a separate company to
provide information about the HMO choices and to facilitate enrollment.) When choosing an
HMO, clients also choose a primary care physician, which choice they are able to alter at any
time without cause. Pennsylvania reimburses the HMOs for their enrollees’ care on a fixed-rate,
pre-paid basis.
The state had several advantages that increased the likelihood of a successful switch to manda-
tory managed care. It already had experience working with HMOs to provide Medicaid services,
principally to children, the elderly, and the disabled, as well as some experience with mandated
managed care for Medicaid patients, having run a pilot program called HealthPASS in some areas
of Philadelphia.5 The state also had the benefits of an effective administrative structure to oversee
the program, as well as a strong advocacy group to act as an independent monitor (Johnston,
2003).
There were some changes in the program over time. For example, the state originally planned
to use HMOs that specialized in Medicaid patients only.6 The state also planned that clients
5In 1996, the share of Pennsylvania’s Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in some form of managed care was already
32 %.
6While specialization might make an HMO more cognizant of the particular problems of Medicaid patients, such
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would have at least four HMOs to choose among: implementation zones were organized so that
each HMO could expect to enroll at least 35,000, the anticipated break-even point (Johnston,
2003). As the program expanded to different areas, however, these parameters changed: the state
now ensures that at least three firms operate in each zone, some of the current HMOs providing
services to Medicaid patients also serve other populations, and HMOs are now expected to enroll
at least 10,000 patients.
Pennsylvania’s original plan was to implement HealthChoices in phases, with the goal of
moving the entire state to mandatory managed care by 2005 (Johnston, 2003). The program
was first introduced in the five counties in and around Philadelphia (HealthChoices Southeast or
Zone 1) in February 1997.7 Implementation continued early in 1999 when the 10 counties in the
southwest corner of the state around Pittsburgh (HealthChoices Southwest or Zone 2) adopted the
program, and late in 2001, when the ten counties in and around the Lehigh Valley and Harrisburg
(HealthChoices Lehigh/Capital or Zone 3) switched to the mandatory managed care program.
However, in 2003 the planned expansion was halted, leaving the state with three different
types of Medicaid provision: the three zones, comprising 25 counties, with mandatory managed
care (“HealthChoices counties”); 25 counties that reimbursed Medicaid providers mainly through
FFS but that also had HMOs that Medicaid patients could elect to use voluntarily (Voluntary
counties); and 17 counties that reimbursed providers of Medicaid services on a FFS basis (FFS
counties).8 See Table 1.1 and the Figure 1.1.
as transportation needs, it also makes the organization more dependent on the state for its revenue, raising the
possibility that budgetary pressures at the state level would lead to lower fees for HMOs, which in turn might cause
reductions in necessary care to Medicaid patients.
7HealthChoices subsumed HealthPASS, the earlier pilot program of mandatory managed care for about half of
the Medicaid patients in Philadelphia, so some patients in Zone 1 were already enrolled in managed care when
HealthChoices was implemented. HealthPASS apparently had no impact on prenatal care or birth outcomes,
possibly because women in HealthPASS could opt for FFS to cover their obstetric care (Goldfarb et al., 1991).
8Pennsylvania resumed expanding HealthChoices to all counties in July 2012, with a planned completion date
for full conversion of March 2013 (Pennsylvania Health Law Project, 2012).
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1.4 Empirical Strategy
1.4.1 Difference-in-Difference Estimation
We first estimate a DD specification using our subsample of Medicaid patients only. In this
estimation, we assume that the common trends for Medicaid patients in all counties are similar,
except for the effects of imposing managed care in HealthChoices counties, and we estimate the
effect of the policy by comparing the change in outcomes occurring in the HealthChoices counties
to the change in outcomes occurring in the control counties.
The pregnant Medicaid patients in the 25 HealthChoices counties therefore represent our
treatment group, where the treatment is switching these patients from FFS to mandatory managed
care. The pregnant Medicaid patients in the 17 FFS counties represent an obvious control group,
and we use them in that way. However, the FFS counties are largely rural, and the patient
populations have a different demographic profile. Although we include variables to control for
variation that may arise from differing patient or geographic characteristics, our estimates may
reflect the effect of uncontrolled variation associated with these differing populations. For example,
if the policy’s implementation would cause less substantive change in more rural counties, then
estimates of the managed care effect found by comparing changes in outcomes in HealthChoices
counties to changes occurring in the FFS counties would suggest a stronger effect than would be
the case if Medicaid patients in FFS counties actually switched to managed care.
The Medicaid patient population in the 25 Voluntary counties, on the other hand, is more
similar to that of the HealthChoices counties, suggesting these counties as an alternative control
group. (See Table 1.2.) However, because managed care was available in these counties on a vol-
untary basis, the treatment of moving from FFS to mandatory managed care in the HealthChoices
counties is only partial relative to the Voluntary counties, as some patients in those counties also
enrolled in managed care. Estimates of the impact of managed care would therefore be biased
downward, when measured relative to the Voluntary counties.
Consequently, we report estimates for the effect of managed care using the FFS counties and
the Voluntary counties as alternative control groups. We expect estimates using the FFS counties
as a control will represent an upper bound on the impact of managed care on patient outcomes,
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while estimates using the Voluntary counties as a control will represent a lower bound, given the
partial nature of the treatment.
Table 1.3 shows the percentage of pregnant Medicaid patients enrolled in managed care in each
group of counties during the years of our study, with the first three rows showing the enrollment
figures for the three HealthChoices zones, and the fourth and fifth rows showing enrollment in
the Voluntary and FFS counties. The numbers for the HealthChoices counties show the jump
in managed care enrollment in the year mandatory managed care was adopted. However, the
numbers also indicate that some women in the mandatory zones were not enrolled in managed
care after the counties switched. Some of these discrepancies, which shrank over time, may reflect
coding error and learning on the part of hospitals. More importantly, women that were already
pregnant at the time of the switch to HealthChoices were allowed to stay with their current OB-
GYN until the end of their postpartum period even if that doctor was not part of the system
the patient selected, which also delayed the point of complete conversion.9 However, because we
use the outcomes of all Medicaid patients in the HealthChoices counties to measure the effect
of managed care, our estimate will be biased toward zero if some patients were still enrolled
in the FFS system, that is, we estimate the effect of the “intent to treat” rather than actual
implementation of HealthChoices if some fraction of the Medicaid patients in the HealthChoices
counties were not covered by managed care.
The fourth and fifth rows of Table 1.3 show the percentage of patients enrolled in managed
care in each of the two control groups. While the percent of such patients is much smaller, the
numbers show that use of managed care increased in all counties over the period, even those that
purportedly relied entirely on FFS, perhaps in anticipation of the planned state-wide implemen-
tation of HealthChoices.10 Consequently, we include a group-specific linear time trend for each of
these five groups of counties in our estimations to control for the general increase in enrollment
in managed care by Medicaid patients.
9Existence of the exemption was verified through personal communication with Pennsylvania Health Law Project,
Pittsburgh, PA, 2012.
10HMO participation by Medicaid patients living in two “FFS-only” counties was confined to only two of the 17
counties in this group.
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1.4.2 Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference Estimation
The DD estimation assumes that the only different shock affecting Medicaid patients in the
treatment counties stems from the switch to managed care; otherwise, forces causing changes in
outcomes for Medicaid patients in treatment and control counties are similar. However, county-
specific shocks, such as economic downturns, may also affect outcomes for Medicaid patients; if
that is the case, the DD methodology will cause these effects to be included in the measurement
of the effect of the policy change.
However, if we assume that mothers with commercial insurance experience these same id-
iosyncratic shocks, then we can use changes in the outcomes of commercially-insured mothers
to control for their effect. In essence, we estimate a DD specification identical to the DD spec-
ification we estimate for the subsample of Medicaid mothers, but instead use the subsample of
commercially-insured mothers in the treatment and control counties. The result is the estimated
difference between changes in outcomes of commercially-insured mothers in the HealthChoices
counties and changes in outcomes for commercially-insured mothers in the control counties. The
DDD estimation procedure finds the difference in these two DD estimations, that is, the effect of
the policy for Medicaid mothers will be estimated having controlled for changes that are affecting
Medicaid mothers in both the treatment and control counties, and having controlled for shocks
that also affect commercially-insured mothers in the treatment and control counties (and thus are
not the result of the policy change).
The DDD specification includes the most extensive set of controls for unknown sources of
variation that might bias our estimate of the effect of Medicaid managed care and thus is our main
specification. However, in the DDD estimation outcomes for commercially-insured mothers in
HealthChoices counties are assumed to be unaffected by the implementation of the HealthChoices
program. If the HealthChoices program reduces the revenues that providers earn from Medicaid
patients, they may increase charges or increase services provided to the commercially insured
patients, in which case using commercially-insured patients as a control for region-specific trends
in the regression may cause the effects of HealthChoices on cost and utilization to be overstated.
We therefore present estimation results for both the DD and DDD specifications.
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1.4.3 Mother Fixed Effects
We estimate all DD and DDD specifications with mother fixed effects included, because the
health behaviors or attitudes of individual mothers may affect the outcomes of their pregnancies.
Therefore, in the DD estimation we estimate the impact of managed care for Medicaid mothers
by comparing changes in outcomes for Medicaid mothers in the HealthChoices counties who
have more than one pregnancy during our sample period before and after managed care was
implemented, to changes in outcomes for Medicaid mothers who have more than one pregnancy
during our sample period but live in a county in the control group of counties. In the DDD
estimation we compare the changes in outcomes for Medicaid mothers in the treatment counties
who have more than one pregnancy before and after HealthChoices was implemented to those for
commercially-insured mothers in the treatment counties who have more than one pregnancy before
and after HealthChoices was implemented, relative to the difference in the change in outcomes
(the DD) between Medicaid and commercially-insured mothers giving birth more than once in
the control counties.
1.4.4 Specifications
The DD specification we estimate using the subsample of Medicaid mothers is:
Outcomeijkt = β0 + β1HealthChoicesk × POSTt + β2Y EARt
+ β3COUNTYk + β4TRENDkt + α1Pijkt + α2Hjt +MFEi + ijkt, (1.1)
where Outcome is one of the three measures of outcomes for patient i, who lives in county k and
delivers in hospital j in yeart, Y EAR and COUNTY are fixed effects for the year of delivery
and for the county where the patient lives, TREND is a vector of four linear time trends, one
for each group of counties in each HealthChoices zone and one for the control group counties, P
is a vector of time-varying characteristics of the patient, H is a vector of characteristics of the
hospital and the hospital market where delivery takes place, and MFE is mother fixed effects.11
11Note that all time-invariant individual characteristics will be excluded when mother fixed effects are included.
COUNTYk is included because some mothers move between counties. We will consider mother’s mobility in our
robustness check.
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The key variable is HealthChoices × POST . The variable HealthChoices equals one if the
patient lives in one of the counties where mandatory managed care was adopted during the sample
period, and zero if they live in one of the counties in a control group. The variable POST equals
one if the patient’s delivery occurs after HealthChoices has been implemented in her county, and
zero if the delivery occurs before that time.12 Thus, the interacted variableHealthChoices∗POST
identifies patients in HealthChoices counties after HealthChoices has been implemented, and its
coefficient β1 is an estimate of the change in outcomes for Medicaid mothers in HealthChoices
counties, compared to their previous pregnancy, relative to changes in outcomes over pregnancies
for Medicaid mothers in either the Voluntary counties or the FFS counties (depending on the
control group used).
The DD specification that we estimate for the commercially-insured mothers is identical to
equation (1).
We estimate the following DDD specification using the full sample of both Medicaid and
commercially-insured births:
Outcomeijkt = β0 + β1Medicaidit ×HealthChoicesk × POSTt + β2Y EARt + β3COUNTYk
+ β4Medicaidit + β5Y EARt × COUNTYk + β6Y EARt ×Medicaidit
+ β7COUNTYk ×Medicaidit + β8TRENDikt + α1Pijkt + α2Hjt +MFEi + ijkt, (1.2)
where Outcome is one of the three measures of outcomes for patient i, who lives in county
k and delivers in hospital j in year t, Medicaid is a dummy variable that equals one if the
patient is covered by Medicaid, and zero if they use commercial insurance, TREND is a vector
of eight insurance-zone specific linear time trends, and the other variables are as defined above.13
Thus, this specification includes fixed effect controls for time-varying changes that affect outcomes
of all deliveries, whether covered by Medicaid or commercial insurance (β2), for time-invariant
characteristics of counties that affect all deliveries (β3), and time-invariant characteristics of all
12The calendar years for which POST equals one are 1997 for the Southeast zone, 1999 for the Southwest
zone, and 2002 for Lehigh/Capital region. Although the switch to HealthChoices actually occurred in 2001 in the
Lehigh/Capital region, it occurred late enough in the year so that we use 2002 as the first year of implementation.
13We treat Medicaid as a time-variant variable in our main specification, but will alternate this specification in
our robustness check.
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Medicaid-insured mothers that affect their outcomes (β4. A second set of interacted variables
control for changes in outcomes over time in different counties for all deliveries (β5), changes over
time that affect the outcomes of all Medicaid-insured mothers (β6), and finally time-invariant
characteristics of Medicaid-insured mothers in different counties that affect their outcomes (β7).
The key variable is Medicaid ∗ HealthChoices ∗ POST because it identifies deliveries by
Medicaid mothers in HealthChoices counties after HealthChoices has been implemented. Its coef-
ficient, β1, is thus an estimate of the change in outcomes for Medicaid mothers in HealthChoices
counties, compared to their previous pregnancy, relative to changes in outcomes over pregnancies
for commercially-insured mothers in the same counties, relative to the same outcome difference
over pregnancies for Medicaid and commercially-insured mothers in the control counties.
1.5 Data, Sample, and Description of Variables
1.5.1 Data and Sample
The data for this paper are from the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4)
inpatient data file for the years 1995-2004, a period that encompasses the implementation of the
HealthChoices program in the three zones.14 Each PHC4 inpatient record includes information
about a patient’s characteristics, zip code of residence, health status, procedure codes, and in-
surance, and also contains identifiers that allow us to link the individual’s inpatient records over
time. The PHC4 records also include a hospital identification number that we used to link the
individual patient records to information about the hospital where the patient’s delivery took
place, drawn from the American Hospital Association Annual Survey of Hospitals.
We selected all cases of vaginal birth or Cesarean section (C-section) in the data for 1995-2004
based on ICD-9 procedure and DRG codes, a sample of 1,377,695 observations. We dropped
patients that were covered neither by Medicaid nor commercial insurance, leaving 1,273,457 ob-
servations, and observations missing race, admission or zip code information, or that appeared
too soon following a previous delivery (i.e., within the following quarter), leaving 1,267,637 ob-
14We end our sample in 2004 because in 2005 the DPW began implementing a primary care case management
(PCCM) program in the Voluntary and the FFS counties (Lave, 2008). In a PCCM program, the state pays primary
care physicians a flat fee per patient for serving as gate keepers to more specialized care.
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servations. We then eliminated records where no live birth resulted for reasons unrelated to
the patient’s health care (ectopic or molar pregnancies, pregnancies with abortive outcomes, and
pregnancies with intrauterine death), records for patients that were not Pennsylvania residents,
and records that were missing hospital characteristics, leaving 1,224,667 observations. Finally, we
eliminated all mothers who had only one pregnancy during 1995-2004, leaving a sample of 669,209
deliveries, 202,947 of which were covered by Medicaid and 466,262 of which were covered by com-
mercial insurance, and all of which were deliveries by mothers who had at least two pregnancies
during the sample period.
1.5.2 Outcomes
We estimate the impact of the program on three separate outcomes measures: the incidence of
preventable complications as a measure of quality, total hospital charges as a measure of cost, and
whether the patient had a C-section as a measure of utilization, all three based on data derived
from the PHC4 inpatient database.
“Preventable complications” are complications that in many cases may be avoided with better
care (Currie & MacLeod, 2008).15 Managed care, with its emphasis on preventive care, specifically
prenatal care in the case of pregnancy, may therefore result in improved outcomes by reducing the
occurrence of preventable complications. The variable OUTCOME equals one if a preventable
complication requiring hospitalization occurred during the patient’s pregnancy (that is, during
the nine months preceding delivery) or during her delivery, and zero otherwise.
Our second outcome variable is the log of total charges, deflated to 1995 dollars using the
CPI-U. Each inpatient record in the PHC4 database includes the total charges for that stay in
the hospital.16 We use the individual patient identifier to find all hospital admissions experienced
by the patient in the nine months preceding their delivery for a pregnancy-related problem17, and
15Preventable complications are: maternal fever, excessive bleeding, maternal seizure, precipitous labor, prolonged
labor, dysfunction labor, anesthetic complications, fetal distress, and rupture of the uterus during labor, and
choriamnionitis (an inflammation of fetal membranes most often occurring with prolonged labor).
16These charges are list prices, not actual costs nor actual reimbursements received by a hospital. Researchers
frequently adjust list prices using the cost-to-charge ratios calculated for each hospital by CMS from Medicare
data. However, there is no cost-to-charge ratio information available for Medicaid patients. We nevertheless tried
adjusting the total charge variable using the Medicare cost-to-charge ratio for the hospital where the charges were
incurred, but found it did not alter our results.
17Pregnancy-related admissions are identified by ICD9 Diagnosis Codes 640-679, excluding 656.4 (intra-uterine
death), and ICD9 Obstetric Procedure Primary and Sub Codes 72, 73, 74.0, 74.1, 74.2, and 74.4.
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sum the charges for all these admissions, plus the charges during the admission for delivery, to
get our measure of total hospital charges for each pregnancy case18.
Our third outcome variable equals one if the delivery is a C-section, and zero otherwise. Fees
for C-sections are higher than for vaginal deliveries, and physicians respond by providing more
of them (Gruber & Owings, 1996; Gruber, Kim & Mayzlin, 1999). Managed care plans, on the
other hand, are paid a fixed premium by the state to provide care to each enrolled client, and thus
have an incentive to control the utilization of unnecessary procedures. Typically HMOs do not
reimburse physicians on a capitated basis for C-sections. However, they may use performance-
based pay, for example a bonus for achieving some predefined level patient care quality that gives
physicians an incentive to reduce the rate of C-sections (Armour et al, 2001). We therefore expect
that the rate of C-section will be lower after the implementation of HealthChoices.
1.5.3 Patient Characteristics
Although using mother fixed effects controls for time-invariant characteristics of individuals that
might affect their outcomes, we use the PHC4 inpatient records to create several variables to
control for relevant characteristics or circumstances of a mother that might change from one
pregnancy to the next. These, represented by Pijkt in equations (1) and (2), include the patient’s
age, whether the patient was referred by a physician, clinic, or HMO, whether the patient was
transferred from another hospital, and whether the delivery admission was an emergency or
weekend admission. Using the ICD-9 diagnosis and procedure codes in the PHC4 inpatient
record, we control for changes in health status by creating dummy variables that indicate whether
a patient had at least one non-preventable complication, defined as birth complications that are
unlikely to have been caused by a doctor at the time of delivery 19, or at least one pre-existing
condition, defined as conditions that are not directly caused by pregnancy but that may affect
18Our total charges variable does not include charges for visits to clinics or primary care physicians, nor for visits
to the hospital triage department, since the data we use does not include information on primary or outpatient
care.
19Non-preventable complications are: a breech delivery, cephalopelvic disproportion (the baby’s head is too big
for the mother’s pelvis), cord prolapse (the umbilical cord is delivered prior to the baby), placenta previa (the
placenta is implanted too close to the cervical opening), abruption placenta (a premature separation of the placenta
from the uterus), and a premature rupture of membranes.
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the delivery outcomes 20, since either may affect treatment choices and total charges. Finally,
we also include dummy variables to control for circumstances that might affect the choice of
delivery procedure or the total change: whether the patient previously had a C-section and
whether the delivery is a multiple birth. In estimations where the outcome is total cost or
preventable complications, we also include dummies indicating whether the delivery is vaginal
with instruments, or a C-section.
1.5.4 Hospital Characteristics
As noted above, each PHC4 inpatient record includes a numerical identifier for the hospital
where the admission occurred, and we were able to attach hospital names and addresses to these
identifiers. We then used the hospital name and zip code to link the PHC4 inpatient data to the
American Hospital Association Annual Survey of Hospitals database and thereby add information
about the hospital to the admission record. We use this information to control for the effects of
hospital characteristics and hospital markets, represented by Hjt in equations (1) and (2), on
patient outcomes.
We include dummy variables indicating whether the hospital has 200 to 400 beds (medium
size), or more than 400 beds (large size), with the omitted group as hospitals with fewer than 200
beds; whether the hospital is not-for-profit (NFP), with the omitted group for-profit hospitals;
whether the hospital is a member of the Council of Teaching Hospital of the Association of
American Medical College (teaching); and whether the hospital has a level two or level three
obstetrical unit, with the omitted group being hospitals with a level one obstetrical unit.
We also include a variable that measures the percentage of a hospital’s patients that are
covered by Medicaid in the year of delivery, as well as a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for
each hospital, because competition in hospital markets may influence the impact of managed care
on patient outcomes (Gowrisankaran and Town, 2003). We construct hospital HHIs using the
“variable radius” method (Gresenz et al., 2004), where a hospital’s market is determined by the
area from which it draws 75% of all of its patients.
20Pre-existing conditions are: anemia, herpes, eclampsia, incompetent cervix, Rhesus (anti-D) iso-immunization,
uterine bleeding, hypertensive disorder, oligohydramnios, abnormality of vagina (congenItal or acquired), diabetes
mellitus/abnormal glucose tolerance, and habitual aborter.
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Table 1.4 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimations, for the entire
sample and for the Medicaid and commercially insured subsamples, all by Medicaid policy areas.
1.6 Results
The DD and DDD estimation results are shown on Table 1.5: Panel A shows the DD results
for Medicaid patients, Panel B shows DD results for commercially-insured patients, and Panel C
shows the DDD results. Columns (1), (3), and (5) show the impact of HealthChoices on each
outcome with the Voluntary counties as the control group the lower bound estimate and columns
(2), (4), and (6) show the impact of HealthChoices on each outcome with the FFS counties as
the control group the upper bound estimate. All estimations include the patient and hospital
characteristics described in section 5, as well as year, county, and mother fixed effects, and a
separate time trend for each HealthChoices zone and for the control group. Standard errors are
clustered at the county level.
The results in Panel A suggest that HealthChoices reduced the probability of preventable
complications relative to both of the two control groups. As anticipated, the estimated effect is
smaller when the control group is the Voluntary counties as opposed to the FFS counties, but
the difference is small. The estimated coefficients for the log of total charges and for C-section
were negative but never significant. (Note that the county-group-specific trends are all positive
and significant, which is the opposite impact on outcomes as the effect of the managed care
policy.) Inspection of Panel B, on the other hand, shows no significant changes in the outcomes
in these areas for commercially-insured patients after HealthChoices was adopted. The findings
suggest that the commercially-insured patients were unaffected by the policy change experienced
by Medicaid patients in the treatment counties, and that changes in their outcomes may be used
in the DDD specification without concern.
Panel C shows that adding controls for regional variation affecting all pregnant patients does
not change our results. The probability of preventable complications occurring in a pregnancy is
1.1 percentage points lower after HealthChoices begins, which, relative to the mean for Medicaid
patients in the treatment counties in 1996, implies that the probability decreased by 10.5-10.7%.
We continue to find that HealthChoices changed neither the log of total charge nor the probability
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of a patient receiving a C-section,
1.6.1 Robustness Checks
The stability of our estimates under the DD and the DDD specifications, as well as relative to the
two alternative control groups, suggests our results are robust. However, we also report a more
formal set of robustness checks on the different panels of Table 1.6. In all cases we report results
for the DDD specification only.
Clustering
We start by trying an alternative clustering rule. Instead of clustering standard errors at the
county level, we cluster them at the zone-year level. The resulting DDD estimations are shown in
Panel A of Table 1.6. Our results for preventable complications remain unchanged, but we also
see some evidence that HealthChoices may also reduce the log of total charge.
Singleton Births
The literature studying the effect of managed care on low birth weight examines samples of ‘sin-
gleton’ births, because multiple births (e.g., twins) usually result in lower birth weight as a matter
of course. Cases of multiple gestation are also more likely to be associated with complications,
C-sections, and higher charges. We therefore re-estimated our DDD specification using only sin-
gleton births. Panel B of Table 1.6 indicates that restricting our sample in this way does not
change our findings regarding the direction and significance of the effect of HealthChoices on
preventable complications.
Mother Mobility
A Medicaid-insured mother may have managed care insurance either because it becomes mandated
in the county where she lives, the assumption of our estimation strategy, or because she moves
from one of the control counties to one of the HealthChoices counties. Because patients may
move among policy areas, the estimated effect of HealthChoices reflects the combined effect of
the policy change and of mothers’ movements between the treatment and control groups. The
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numbers of such patients were not large21, but we tested whether they might be influencing our
results by assigning to all such mothers the Medicaid reimbursement system that they would
have experienced had they remained in the county where they lived when we first observed them.
Although altering the data for mothers that move introduces measurement error in the county
variables, it excludes from the estimates the effects of self-selection arising from mothers moving
to a county with a different Medicaid reimbursement system. The results, presented in Panel C
of Table 1.6, show that after making this adjustment we continue to find that HealthChoices is
associated with a lower incidence of preventable complications.
Medicaid Enrollment
Some of the mothers in our sample were covered by Medicaid for only one of their deliveries22.
We tested whether our results were driven by movements of mothers into and out of the Medicaid
system by assigning each mother the insurance status that she had at her first delivery. The
results of re-estimating the DDD are shown in Panel D of Table 1.6. The signs and significance
of our variables are unchanged.
1.7 Effects of Patient Health Status and Adjustment Lags
1.7.1 Patient Health Status
We test whether the impact of HealthChoices varies with the health status of the mother: managed
care, with its emphasis on preventive care, may be particularly effective for Medicaid mothers in
poorer health. We divide the patients into high and low risk categories depending on whether
the mother has a pre-existing condition or a non-preventable complication, and re-estimate the
DDD specification, interacting the Medicaid × HealthChoices × POST variable with HI, a
dummy variable identifying high risk patients, and with LO, a dummy variable identifying low
risk patients.
21During the sample period, 7995 of the 238,795 or 3.3% of the Medicaid deliveries represent deliveries that
occurred to a mother who had moved from a county in a treatment group to a county in the control group, or
vice versa, while 15,618 out of 534,413 or 2.9% of the commercially insured births were to mothers who had moved
between county groups.
22During the sample period, 28,742 or 5.4% of the 534,413 commercially-insured births were by mothers whose
first delivery in the sample period was covered by Medicaid, and 33,785 or 14.1% of the 238,795 Medicaid deliveries
were by mothers whose first delivery was commercially-insured.
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Our results are shown on Table 1.7. We continue to find evidence that preventable compli-
cations are significantly lower in HealthChoices areas. Inspection of the magnitudes shows that
for high risk patients, preventable complications are reduced by 2.1-2.2 percentage points, while
the impact on low risk patients, also negative although only significant relative the to the FFS
control group, is .6-.7 percentage points. Relative to the mean value of preventable complications
for each group in 1996, these coefficients imply that the probability of preventable complications
fell by 15.9-16.7% for high risk patients, and by 8-9% for low risk patients.
Perhaps the most interesting results are those for C-sections. Our DDD estimations on Table
1.5 suggested that managed care had no separate impact on the rate of C-sections. However,
the results on Table 1.7 show that the HealthChoices program affects the probability of C-section
differently for the two risk categories: mothers in worse health, those with pre-existing conditions,
were 1-1.3 percentage points more likely to have a C-section, which, relative to the mean in 1996,
indicates an increase of 3.6-4.7%. The coefficients for the low-risk mothers, on the other hand,
were negative but not significant. Our results thus show that the impact of HealthChoices was to
increase the intensity of care for sicker patients, while having no effect on, or possibly reducing,
the intensity of care for healthier patients. .
1.7.2 Adjustment Lags
In our estimations we assume that the impact of the managed care policy begins immediately
with its implementation. It may be, however, that the impact is delayed, as patients and
providers adjust to the new system, particularly since adjustment may involve patients choos-
ing new doctors when they choose their HMO, and because patients already pregnant at the
time of the implementation could continue to see their OB-GYN for that pregnancy. We test
for lags in the impact of managed care adoption in the years subsequent to adoption by re-
placing the interacted policy variable, Medicaid × HealthChoices × POST , with three other
variables: Medicaid × HealthChoices × POST1, Medicaid × HealthChoices × POST2, and
Medicaid ×HealthChoices × POST3+. POST1 and POST2 are dummy variables that equal
one in the first or second year after adoption of HealthChoices in the patient’s particular county.
POST3+ equals one if HealthChoices was adopted three or more years ago in a county. (We do
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not investigate longer lags because three years is the longest lag we can accommodate given the
later switch to managed care in the Lehigh/Capital zone and the final year, 2004, of our data
set.)
The results on Table 1.8 continue to show that the switch to HealthChoices is associated
with a reduction in preventable complications, but suggest that the initial effect may more than
double in magnitude within three years, reducing the probability of preventable complications by
23.8-25.2%. In addition, there is some evidence that the switch to HealthChoices may eventually
reduce costs: the estimated coefficients on the log of total charge show that total charges are
19.7% lower (calculated as exp(0.18)-1) after three years of the new program. Given that the
mean of total charges for Medicaid patients in treatment counties in 1996 (the year prior to the
adoption of HealthChoices anywhere in Pennsylvania) was $5,542, this percentage translates into
a $1,092 reduction per case.
1.8 Conclusion
The stated goals for switching from FFS to managed care in Pennsylvania included increasing the
quality of care while controlling the cost. We found that the switch to managed care resulted in
fewer patients with preventable complications, and, eventually, in lower charges. We also found
that the reduction in preventable complications was larger among high risk patients, who also
were more likely to receive C-sections. Thus, the HealthChoices program may have achieved lower
costs and better health outcomes by providing better preventive care, particularly to higher risk
patients. However, the full benefits from switching to managed care may take several years to
develop, possibly because some pregnant women delay their switch until after their pregnancy is
over. We reach these conclusions having employed a DDD specification, as well as mother fixed
effects, so as to reduce the potential biases arising from uncontrolled variation and heterogeneity;
the results were robust to several changes in the specification.
Our results support a more positive view of managed care than such studies as Aizer et al.
(2007). However, differences in results for different states may reflect the real impact of different
institutional arrangements (Marton, et al., 2012). Pennsylvania had the advantage of some exper-
imental experience with mandatory managed care, a well-regarded management structure, and a
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strong advocacy group for Medicaid patients (Johnston, 2003). Further, the state’s requirement
that at least three managed care companies be available for patients to choose among provided
for at least some level of competition among the firms. More research on the effect that these or
other differences may have had on the impact of switching Medicaid patients to managed care in
different states would help us determine whether a well-designed Medicaid managed care program
can achieve cost control and better care for its enrollees.
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Figure 1.1: HealthChoices, Voluntary Managed Care and Non-Managed Care Counties, Pennsyl-
vania
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Table 1.1: Implementation dates and different zones in Pennsylvania
Zone Date Counties
HealthChoices Counties 1997
Southeast Counties (Zone 1)
Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery and Philadelphia counties
1999
Southwest Counties (Zone 2)
Allegheny, Armstrong, Beaver, Butler, Fayette, Green, Indiana,
Lawrence, Washington and Westmoreland
2002
Lehigh/Capital Counties (Zone 3)
Adams, Berks, Cumberland, Dauphin, Lancaster, Lebanon,
Lehigh, Northampton, Perry and York
Voluntary Managed Care
Counties
– Bedford, Blair, Bradford, Cambria, Carbon, Clarion, Clearfield,
Columbia, Crawford, Erie, Forest, Franklin, Jefferson, Lack-
awanna, Luzerne, Mercer, Monroe, Montour,Northumberland,
Pike, Schuylkill, Somerset, Sullivan, Susquehanna, Warren, and
Wyoming
None-Managed Care
Counties
– Cameron, Centre, Clinton, Elk, Fulton, Huntingdon, Juniata, Ly-
coming, Mckean, Mifflin, Potter, Snyder, Tioga, Union, Venango,
and Wayne
1 HealthChoices was implemented late in 2001 for zone 3, so we use 2002 as the first year of implemen-
tation for this zone.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics for County Characteristics, by Coverage Type
Variables All Counties HealthChoices Counties Voluntary Counties FFS Counties
Poverty ratio 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11
Population density 2225.95 2857.92 232.17 98.52
Median income 41122.87 43205.29 34515.74 34229.30
Unemployment rate 5.91 5.57 7.12 6.65
1 Population density (persons/squ mile) is linearly imputed from the 1990 and 2000 census data for
each county; median income ($) and poverty ratio(%) at the county and year level is from the small
area income and poverty estimates from Census website. Unemployment rate(%) is from Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Department of Labor website.
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Table 1.3: Percentage of Pregnant Medicaid Patients Enrolled in Managed Care, by Year
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
HealthChoices Counties
Southeast (Zone 1) 0.12 0.27 0.66 0.76 0.83 0.89 0.9 0.9 0.91 0.93
Southwest (Zone 2) 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.26 0.71 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95
Lehigh/Capital (Zone 3) 0.01 0.07 0.22 0.22 0.31 0.31 0.3 0.78 0.9 0.91
Voluntary Counties 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.21 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.37 0.38
FFS Counties 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07
1 Calculated from PHC4 inpatient database.
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Table 1.5: DD and DDD Results
Preventable Complications Log of Total Charge C-section
Panel A: DD, Medicaid Only
HealthChoices*POST -0.0105** -0.0107** -0.0458 -0.0439 -0.0048 -0.0040
[0.005] [0.005] [0.052] [0.048] [0.003] [0.003]
Trend/Southeast 0.0084*** 0.0089*** 0.1070*** 0.1070*** 0.0150*** 0.0148***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [0.005] [0.001] [0.001]
Trend/Southwest 0.0055*** 0.0060*** 0.0612*** 0.0595*** 0.0178*** 0.0176***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.008] [0.008] [0.001] [0.001]
Trend/Lehigh&Capital 0.0052*** 0.0056*** 0.0167** 0.0144* 0.0149*** 0.0148***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.007] [0.008] [0.001] [0.001]
Trend/Voluntary 0.0035*** 0.0225*** 0.0189***
[0.001] [0.006] [0.001]
Trend/FFS 0.0008 0.0224** 0.0194***
[0.002] [0.009] [0.002]
Obs: No. of Deliveries 189,521 158,546 189,521 158,546 189,521 158,546
R-Squared 0.011 0.011 0.317 0.335 0.149 0.149
Number of Mothers 105,296 89,047 105,296 89,047 105,296 89,047
Control Group VOL FFS VOL FFS VOL FFS
Panel B: DD, Commercially-insured only
HealthChoices*POST 0.0015 0.0010 -0.0045 -0.0046 0.0015 0.0008
[0.003] [0.003] [0.023] [0.023] [0.002] [0.002]
Trend/Southeast 0.0018* 0.0025** 0.0693*** 0.0690*** 0.0165*** 0.0169***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.004] [0.001] [0.001]
Trend/Southwest -0.0020 -0.0013 0.0546*** 0.0537*** 0.0152*** 0.0156***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [0.006] [0.001] [0.001]
Trend/Lehigh&Capital -0.0008 -0.0002 0.0095** 0.0085* 0.0120*** 0.0122***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.005] [0.001] [0.001]
Trend/Voluntary 0.0010 0.0179*** 0.0174***
[0.001] [0.005] [0.001]
Trend/FFS -0.0030 0.0177*** 0.0191***
[0.002] [0.006] [0.002]
Obs: # of Deliveries 440,978 390,278 440,978 390,278 440,978 390,278
R-Squared 0.030 0.030 0.264 0.265 0.159 0.159
Number of Mothers 225,828 200,372 225,828 200,372 225,828 200,372
Control Group VOL FFS VOL FFS VOL FFS
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Table 1.5: DD and DDD Results (continued)
Preventable Complications Log of Total Charge C-section
Panel C DDD, Medicaid & Commercially-insured
Medicaid*HealthChoices*POST -0.0110** -0.0123*** -0.0898 -0.0893 -0.0010 -0.0008
[0.005] [0.004] [0.061] [0.061] [0.004] [0.004]
Medicaid*Trend/Southeast 0.0065*** 0.0066*** 0.0451*** 0.0447*** 0.0012 0.0012
[0.001] [0.001] [0.009] [0.009] [0.001] [0.001]
Medicaid*Trend/Southwest 0.0043*** 0.0046*** 0.0204*** 0.0193*** 0.0018** 0.0016**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.005] [0.001] [0.001]
Medicaid*Trend/Lehigh&Capital 0.0046*** 0.0047*** 0.0006 -0.0008 0.0006 0.0005
[0.001] [0.001] [0.008] [0.008] [0.001] [0.001]
Medicaid*Trend/Voluntary 0.0019** 0.0064 0.0017**
[0.001] [0.004] [0.001]
Medicaid*Trend/FFS 0.0033* 0.0059 0.0005
[0.002] [0.005] [0.001]
Obs: # of Deliveries 630,499 548,824 630,499 548,824 630,499 548,824
R-Squared 0.023 0.023 0.275 0.279 0.153 0.153
Number of Mothers 283,618 249,469 283,618 249,469 283,618 249,469
Control Group VOL FFS VOL FFS VOL FFS
1 Standard errors, reported in brackets, are clustered at the county level in Panel A and B. All regressions also
include the patient and hospital characteristics described in section 5, as well as year and county and mother
fixed effects; regressions in the first four columns also include a variable indicating whether the delivery was
a C-section.
2 c Standard errors, reported in brackets, are clustered at the county level in Panel C. All regressions also
include the patient and hospital characteristics described in section 5, as well as year, county, and Medicaid
fixed effects, the interactions of these fixed effects indicated in specification (2), and mother fixed effects.
3 *** Significant at the 1 percent level (two-tailed test); ** Significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test); *
Significant at the 10 percent level (two-tailed test).
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Table 1.6: Robustness Checks
Preventable Complications Log of Total Charge C-section
Panel A: Cluster by Zone-Year
Medicaid* HealthChoices* POST
-0.0110*** -0.0123*** -0.0898*** -0.0893*** -0.0010 -0.0008
[0.003] [0.003] [0.029] [0.030] [0.003] [0.003]
Observations: # of Deliveries 630,499 548,824 630,499 548,824 630,499 548,824
R-squared 0.023 0.023 0.275 0.279 0.153 0.153
Number of Mothers 283,618 249,469 283,618 249,469 283,618 249,469
Control Group VOL FFS VOL FFS VOL FFS
Panel B: Singleton Births
Medicaid* HealthChoices* POST
-0.0124** -0.0137*** -0.0910 -0.0906 0.0002 0.0004
[0.005] [0.004] [0.061] [0.061] [0.003] [0.004]
Observations: # of Deliveries 621,862 541,118 621,862 541,118 621,862 541,118
R-squared 0.024 0.023 0.260 0.265 0.137 0.137
Number of Mothers 283,411 249,220 283,411 249,220 283,411 249,220
Control Group VOL FFS VOL FFS VOL FFS
Panel C: Mobility
Medicaid* HealthChoices* POST
-0.0078* -0.0091** -0.1114* -0.1044* 0.0017 0.0020
[0.004] [0.004] [0.057] [0.060] [0.003] [0.003]
Observations: # of Deliveries 631,145 550,126 631,145 550,126 631,145 550,126
R-squared 0.023 0.023 0.259 0.264 0.152 0.152
Number of Mothers 280,773 245,158 280,773 245,158 280,773 245,158
Control Group VOL FFS VOL FFS VOL FFS
Panel D: Medicaid Insurance Status
Medicaid* HealthChoices* POST
-0.0071** -0.0076** -0.0554 -0.0522 -0.0015 -0.0013
[0.003] [0.003] [0.047] [0.047] [0.003] [0.003]
Observations: # of Deliveries 630,499 548,824 630,499 548,824 630,499 548,824
R-squared 0.023 0.023 0.276 0.280 0.153 0.017
Number of Mothers 283,618 249,469 283,618 249,469 283,618 249,469
Control Group VOL FFS VOL FFS VOL FFS
1 Standard errors, reported in brackets, are clustered at the county level except for Panel A, where they
are clustered at the zone-year level. All regressions also include the patient and hospital characteristics
described in section 5, year, county, and Medicaid fixed effects, the interactions of these fixed effects indicated
in specification (2), and mother fixed effects. All estimations also include a separate time trend for each
HealthChoices zone and for the control group; regressions in the first four columns also include a variable
indicating whether the delivery was a C-section.
2 *** Significant at the 1 percent level (two-tailed test); ** Significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test);
* Significant at the 10 percent level (two-tailed test).
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Table 1.7: DDD Estimations by Patient Health Status
Preventable Complications Log of Total Charge C-section
Medicaid* HealthChoices
POST* HI
-0.0208** -0.0219** -0.0918 -0.0899 0.0098* 0.0127**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.073] [0.073] [0.005] [0.005]
Medicaid* HealthChoices
POST* LO
-0.0058 -0.0072** -0.0888 -0.0891 -0.0068 -0.0080
[0.004] [0.003] [0.055] [0.055] [0.005] [0.005]
Observations: # of Deliveries 630,499 548,824 630,499 548,824 630,499 548,824
R-squared 0.023 0.023 0.275 0.279 0.153 0.153
Number of Mothers 283,618 249,469 283,618 249,469 283,618 249,469
Control Group VOL FFS VOL FFS VOL FFS
1 Standard errors, reported in brackets, are clustered at the county level. All regressions also include the
patient and hospital characteristics described in section 5, year, county, and Medicaid fixed effects, the
interactions of these fixed effects indicated in specification (2), and mother fixed effects. All estimations
also include a separate time trend for each HealthChoices zone and for the control group; regressions in
the first four columns also include a variable indicating whether the delivery was a C-section.
2 *** Significant at the 1 percent level (two-tailed test); ** Significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test);
* Significant at the 10 percent level (two-tailed test).
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Table 1.8: DDD Estimations with Lags
Preventable Complications Log of Total Charge C-section
Medicaid* HealthChoices* POST1
-0.0086* -0.0094** -0.0871 -0.0876 0.0026 0.0030
[0.005] [0.004] [0.059] [0.058] [0.003] [0.004]
Medicaid* HealthChoices* POST2
-0.0116** -0.0132*** -0.0796 -0.0772 -0.0054 -0.0052
[0.005] [0.005] [0.061] [0.061] [0.004] [0.004]
Medicaid* HealthChoices* POST3+
-0.0238*** -0.0252*** -0.1776** -0.1813** 0.0032 0.0030
[0.007] [0.007] [0.070] [0.072] [0.004] [0.004]
Observations: # of Deliveries 630,499 548,824 630,499 548,824 630,499 548,824
R-squared 0.023 0.023 0.276 0.280 0.153 0.153
Number of Mothers 283,618 249,469 283,618 249,469 283,618 249,469
Control Group VOL FFS VOL FFS VOL FFS
1 Standard errors, reported in brackets, are clustered at the county level. All regressions also include the patient
and hospital characteristics described in section 5, year, county, and Medicaid fixed effects, the interactions of
these fixed effects indicated in specification (2), and mother fixed effects. All estimations also include a separate
time trend for each HealthChoices zone and for the control group; regressions in the first four columns also
include a variable indicating whether the delivery was a C-section.
2 *** Significant at the 1 percent level (two-tailed test); ** Significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test); *
Significant at the 10 percent level (two-tailed test).
Chapter 2
Medicare Part D Program
Medicare Part D, Physician Prescribing and
Drug Utilization: A
Difference-in-Discontinuity Approach
2.1 Introduction
In the first 40 years after its creation in 1965, Medicare provided no insurance coverage for bene-
ficiaries’ prescription drug costs. In 2003, about 27% of seniors aged 65 and above lacked a source
of insurance coverage for prescription drugs. Meanwhile, prescription drug expenditures for the
elderly increased rapidly at an annual rate of 12%. Associations between the lack of prescription
drug coverage and low drug compliance as well as worse health status was establish by researchers
in public health and economics.1 Beginning in January 2006, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Im-
provement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA 2003 hereafter) introduced a new drug benefit
through Medicare Part D. It offered drug coverage for the first time, thereby lowering the fraction
of prescription drug costs that many Medicare beneficiaries had to pay out-of-pocket at the point
of service. Adoption of Part D was the single largest change in health insurance coverage for the
elderly since 1965.
The effects of Medicare Part D and its costs have significant policy implications. Part D has
1Federman et al., (2001) found that elderly Medicare beneficiaries with coronary heart disease who lack drug
coverage are less likely to use statins, which are relatively expensive but proven to be effective in improving survival.
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potentially benefited Medicare beneficiaries. Before Part D, Medicare beneficiaries obtained drug
coverage through employer-sponsered plan (28%), Medicare HMO plans (15%), Medigap plans
(7%), Medicaid plans (10%) and other State Pharmacy Assistance programs (2%) according to
a technical report from Kaiser Family Foundation published in 2003. The copayments of some
coverages are high and access to those coverages are declining. Since 2006, Part D has become
the primary source of drug coverage for Medicare beneficiaries, covering more than half of all
beneficiaries (57%) in 2006. It decreased the percentage of Medicare beneficiaries with no source
of prescription drug coverage from 27% in 2003 to 10% in 2007 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2003;
Kaiser Family Foundation, 2006; Kaiser Family Foundation, 2007). Improved prescription drug
coverage is likely to result in changes in expenditures for other medical care services or changes
in health status, although there is no consistent evidence from past research on whether Part D
led to lower expenditures on other services and better health status, or higher expenditures and
worse health status.
On the other side, this program is costly. Part D has shifted prescription drug costs from
Medicaid or other private payers to Medicare, and has contributed to a net increase in federal
spending. The Medicare share of total national spending on prescription drugs increased from 2%
in 2005 to 22% in 2006, and the net federal cost of the Part D program is estimated to be $982
billion for nine years between 2007 and 2016 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2007). The nationwide
implementation of a policy with such high costs has raised a lot of concern and criticism.
Past literature has studied the effect of Part D on the utilization and out-of-pocket cost of
prescription drugs (Lichtenberg and Sun, 2007; Briesacher et al.,2011; Ketcham and Simon, 2008;
Kaestner and Khan, 2012). Although they differ in the estimates of the magnitude of the effect
of Part D, they all found that utilization of prescription drugs increased, and out-of-pocket cost
decreased for elderly patients after 2006 compared to changes among younger patients. Other
studies, focused on the supply side of the health care market, found that brand-name drugs with
a high pre-Part D market share experienced slower price increases, and increase in utilization
compared to other drugs (Duggan and Morton, 2010). However, none of the previous studies
have examined the relationship between Part D and physicians’ prescribing pattern.
Physicians are not directly reimbursed for prescribing drugs, but they still play an important
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role in determining which drugs patients get. Acting as agents on behalf of the patient, physicians
are expected to incorporate their patients’ best interest when writing prescriptions. They are
expected to (jointly) maximize their profit function and the utility of their patients subject to
patients’ budget constraints. The adoption of Part D is intended to decrease the out-of-pocket cost
faced by patients, and is a component in their budget constraint. Thus, it is reasonable to assume
that physicians would alter their prescribing patterns since they are indirectly affected by the
policy change through the patients’ budget constraints. Ultimately, these changes in prescribing
behavior can lead to changes in utilization of and expenditure on prescription drugs, as well as
patients’ health outcomes.
In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive assessment of the impact of Medicare Part D on
physicians’ prescribing patterns, and on patient’s utilization of and expenditure for prescription
drugs as well as for other medical care services such as inpatient, outpatient and emergency room
care. We also examine the effect on patients’ health outcomes measured as in-hospital mortality
and the Prevention Quality Indicators (PQI) module developed by the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (AHRQ). We adopt an improved empirical strategy called difference-in-
discontinuity (DD-RD) design. This specification is developed from the difference-in-difference
(DD) and regression discontinuity (RD) specifications that were popular in past Part D-related
studies. The DD-RD allows us to address internal validity issues that exist with the DD strategy,
as well as confounding policy discontinuity issues with the RD design. We will estimate the
policy effect by comparing the discrete jump in outcome values associated with the introduction
of Medicare Part D for our sample before 2006 at the age 65 cutoff and for the sample after 2006.
We study three research questions in this paper. The first is whether the adoption of Part D
policy affects physicians’ prescribing patterns. We link National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey
data (NAMCS) data for 2002-04 and 2006-09 with U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
orange book data and construct a visit-level sample for patients between 60 and 69 years old.
We then estimate the Part D effect by exploiting the difference between physicians’ prescribing
patterns before and after the adoption of Part D in January of 2006 for patients above 65 years
old, and that of patients below 65. After controlling for confounding factors, we estimate a 33%
increase in the number of prescription drugs prescribed and a 55% increase in the number of
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generic drugs. We do not find evidence that Part D affects other practicing patterns such as the
total number of drugs prescribed, the number of tests ordered by physicians and the duration of
visits (in minutes). We further construct a prescription-level data sample for patients between 60
and 69 years old to analyze the effect of Part D on the age of active ingredients in prescribed drugs,
measured by the difference in time between the drug approval date and the date the physician
prescribed the drug,2 and find no significant change in the age of prescribed drugs either. We
also find evidence of an anticipatory effect that is not well addressed in most past Part D related
research. There was a two-year gap between the announcement of Part D policy in December,
2003 and the actual policy implementation in January, 2006. Both patients and physicians might
anticipate the policy during this gap and postpone prescribing or filling prescriptions until the
adoption of Part D. We test the size of this effect by comparing estimated effects with and without
observations from the post-announcement, pre initiation period.
The second question we study is the impact of Part D on utilization of and expenditure for
prescription drugs. We estimate this effect also using our DD-RD specification with data from the
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) for the periods 2002-04 and 2006-09. Results indicate
that the utilization of prescription drugs per person per year rose by 39%, which is a close and
slightly larger effect compared to what we observe in the NAMCS data. This demonstrates that
changes in physicians’ prescribing patterns play an essential role in the impact of Part D policy,
and patients mostly comply with their physician’s prescriptions. We find that total expenditure
and expenditures by Medicare sources for prescription drugs rose, out-of-pocket (OOP) costs
for each prescription fell for elderly patients who turn 65 after 2006, but these effects were not
precisely estimated. We also stratify the sample according to income categories and dual-eligibility
status, and find that non-dually eligible individuals and low-income or near poor individuals are
more affected than others by the adoption of Part D policy.
The last question we examine is whether Part D implementation affected expenditures on
other medical care services and eventually, patients’ health outcomes. We adopt the same DD-
RD specification and use the expenditure component of MEPS data to examine outcomes and
2We merge dates of drug approval from FDA orange book database to the NAMCS data by drug name. If the
drug name as in the NAMCS data merges to more than one approval date, we use the earliest date no matter which
dosage form, applicant or manufacturer this drug belongs to. NAMCS does not contain information on these latter
attributes of drugs prescribed.
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expenditures on other medical care services. We do not find evidence that Part D resulted in
significant changes in total medical expenditures or expenditures for inpatient, outpatient, or
emergency room visits. We then estimated the effect on PQIs, in-hospital mortality, length of
stay and total charges using the National Inpatient Survey (NIS) data set from the Healthcare
Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) for the years 2002-04 and 2006-09. Again, we find no
significant effect of Part D implementation on health status for elderly patients after 2006.
We performed a series of sensitivity analyses in order to check the validity of our DD-RD
specification and to test the robustness of our results with the NAMCS data.3 We plot the
density of running variables on either side of age separately for the sample before 2006 and after
2006, in order to test whether the eligibility criteria is manipulated around the threshold or not
(McCrary, 2008). We validate a necessary assumption that underlying characteristics are smooth
across the threshold in the absence of treatment local to the age cutoff. We also estimate effects
using different bandwidths, different orders of polynomial functions of age, and with and without
baseline covariates. Fourth, we implement a placebo test using an arbitrary cutoff, 64 years old
and over. All robustness check confirm our main findings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a brief overview of Medicare
Part D and of the existing research on its impact. Section III describes the data, outcomes and
independent variables, as well as sample size used in analyses. Section IV discusses the empirical
strategy we use to estimate the effect of Part D on outcomes. Sections V, VI and VII summarize
the results both for the basic specifications and sensitivity analyses. Section VIII concludes, with
a discussion of the policy relevance of our findings and of directions for future research.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Medicare Part D and Enrollment
Prior to the passage of MMA 2003, Medicare only had two fee-for-service components, Part A
and Part B, and one managed care component, Part C. Parts A and B are plans for inpatient
3We only performed the complete set of robustness check with NAMCS data, and part of sensitivity analysis
with MEPS and HCUP data because the latter two datasets do not contain information on specific patients’ birth
date and visit date. And we are not able to perform some of those tests without complete information on patients’
birth date and visit date.
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and outpatient visits and related medical services. Part C, or Medicare Advantage (MA) com-
bines Part A and Part B through private managed care plans. None of these three components
included comprehensive prescription drug coverage. Meanwhile, prescription drug expenditures
were increasing faster than other areas of health care spending. Average annual per capita drug
spending was $2, 318 in 2003 for Medicare beneficiaries, and was increasing at an annual rate of
12%. Because of the lack of drug coverage, many beneficiaries were paying for prescription drugs
out-of-pocket. Medicare beneficiaries paid $644 out-of-pocket for prescription drugs in 2000 on
average, rising to $996 in 2003 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2003). Medicare Part D was created
as part of the MMA 2003 to ensure access to prescription drugs and to limit the financial burden
associated with prescription drug costs. It went into effect on January 1, 2006.
Under Part D, eligible persons can participate voluntarily by enrolling in one of two types
of private insurance plans in his or her area: a Prescription Drug Plan (PDP) that covers only
prescription drugs, or a Medicare Advantage-Prescription Drug Plan (MA-PD) that covers both
medical services and prescription drugs. The decision to enroll or not depends on whether that
person’s current prescription drug coverage offers prescription drug coverage that is equal or better
to the coverage under the standard Medicare benefits, known as a creditable plan. Beneficiaries
enrolled in traditional Medicare (non-managed care) usually obtain drug coverage through a PDP;
those enrolled in a managed care plan through a MA organization generally have to obtain drug
coverage from MA-PD plans. The elderly could also keep their current plan, as long as the
coverage for prescription drugs is creditable compared to a standard plan under Part D. Dual-
eligible beneficiaries, those Medicare beneficiaries who are also Medicaid recipients and had drug
coverage through Medicaid programs, are automatically enrolled in Part D plans.
The adoption of Part D resulted in sharp changes in prescription drug coverage once an
individual reached age 65. About 53% of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in Part D plans in
2006. Specifically, 16.5 million people enrolled in stand-alone PDPs, 6 million people enrolled
into MA-PD plans, and 6.8 million people had other forms of creditable coverage from employer
or union (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2006). After the initial enrollment period, the enrollment
numbers continued to grow, from 53% in 2006 to around 60% in 2010 (Kaiser Family Foundation,
2010). The percentage of Medicare beneficiaries without any drug coverage decreased from 19%
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in 2002 to 10% in June 2006. Although participation in Part D is voluntary, to avoid the problem
of adverse selection, Medicare beneficiaries were charged a financial penalty if they joined the
program after May 15, 2006 unless they were able to demonstrate they had access to creditable
coverage elsewhere. It further ensures for our analysis that transition into drug coverage plans
under Part D at the age 65 cutoff is abrupt.
MMA 2003 required that the standard benefits offered by a prescription drug plan are as
follows: after a $250 annual deductible, Medicare beneficiaries pay 25 percent of prescription
drug costs for the initial coverage of $2, 250. After that, patients pay 100 percent of costs up to
$5, 100, a gap commonly known as the “donut hole”, and 5 percent of costs above $5, 100 which is
also known as catastrophic coverage (Berndt and Frank, 2007). Premium determination process is
complicated. Qualified plans will submit a bid to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS). The bid reflects the plans’ net costs for the drugs, administrative costs and desired profit.
CMS reviews each bid and negotiates with plans before achieving a final bid amount. CMS then
calculates base premiums using the national weighted average bid times a certain percentage, and
each plan can charge beneficiaries the base premium plus or minus the difference between the
national weighted average bid and its own bid amount. The national average monthly premium
increased steadily from $37.37 in 2006 to $46.73 in 2009. On average, Medicare subsidizes about
75 percent of the cost of standard coverage for all types of beneficiaries through different types
of subsidies, including direct subsidies, individual reinsurance, risk sharing payments4 and low-
income subsidies. Specifically, low income subsidies means that those who are also eligible for
Medicaid or under 135% of federal poverty line pay no premium and have no deductible, and those
whose income are between 135% and 150% of the federal poverty line, pay a reduced premium
and annual deductible. Both groups have a lower copayment for covered drugs as a result.
Although all plans are required to be actuarially equivalent with the standard benefit design
described previously, each Part D plan has some flexibility to design their own plan benefits.
Thus, many plans set their own formulary, which is a tiered structure with different levels of cost
sharing across therapeutically similar drugs. Plans often place generics on a tier with the lowest
4Direct subsidy is a monthly prospective payment paid by CMS, which mainly reimburses the plan for the cost
of initial coverage. Individual reinsurance is provided for a certain percentage of drug spending above enrollees’
catastrophic coverage. Medicare finances some unexpectedly high costs or acquires unexpectedly excessive profits
in order to limit plans’ potential losses or gains, which are called risk-sharing payments.
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copayment, preferred brand-name drugs on a tier with a higher copayment, and non-preferred
brand-name drugs on a tier with highest copayment. 5 Thus, through design of plan formularies,
Part D plans encourage the utilization of generic drugs, in order to help control costs in the plan,
and to provide a competitive premium to attract potential consumers.
2.2.2 Hypothesis
We expect Part D to affect physicians’ prescribing pattern. Physicians are not directly reimbursed
for their prescribing behavior. However, there are reasons to expect physicians’ prescribing be-
havior to change after the introduction of Part D. First, a physician’s reputation may be partly
determined by how well they take their patients’ needs into account. This may include both
the ability to attend to their patients’ health needs, and their ability to best tailor treatment
plans to a patient’s financial circumstances. This may in turn provides a disincentive to under-
prescribe drugs where patients do not get necessary medications they can afford under Part D,
or to overprescribe drugs to the extent where the costs exceed the benefits.6 As the patients’
agent, physicians should maximize patient utility subject to a budget constraint. As we discussed
earlier, Part D lowers the average out-of-pocket cost per prescription for Medicare beneficiaries
through decreased copayments for each prescription filled. The reduced copayments for prescrip-
tion drugs should lead to an increase in prescriptions. Additionally, plans can create their own
formularies to encourage the prescription of generic drugs. Last but not the least, the adoption
of Part D coincided with many drug patent expirations. This resulted in increases in the number
of available generic drugs (Hoadley, 2012). For the reasons above, we expect to see changes in the
prescribing patterns measured by number of prescription drugs (especially generic drugs) physi-
cians prescribe to their elderly patients after the introduction of Part D. 7 We also expect Part D
to affect the patients’ utilization and expenditure for prescription drugs conditional on patients
complying with their prescriptions.
We also expect Part D to impact other health care expenditures, and eventually the health sta-
tus of beneficiaries. Greater utilization of prescription drugs might lead to effects on expenditures
5Part D plan formularies are subject to some regulation, for example, they are required to cover all the drugs
under protected drug class and at least two drugs in each therapeutically class.
6 Hellerstein (1998) provided evidence that physicians act as agents for consumers in their prescribing decisions.
7See appendix for a detailed derivation of the theoretical model and theorems.
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for other health care services, and could improve health outcomes. When physicians maximize
patients’ utility subject to a budget constraint, the decreased OOP cost for prescription drugs
results in greater consumption of prescription drugs. As for consumption of other medical goods,
the direction of the effect depends on the cross price elasticity between the consumption of drugs
and those other medical care services . If prescription drugs and other medical services are comple-
ments (cross price elasticity negative), we would expect increases in consumption of other medical
services (Curtis et al., 2004). If prescription drugs and other medical services are substitutes
(cross price elasticity positive), we would expect decreases in consumption of and expenditure on
other medical services, therefore possibly partially offsetting the costs of Part B. Only a small
literature explores this issue and the findings are mixed.
Taken together, we expect that Medicare Part D will increase prescribing of prescription and
generic drugs, and increase patients’ utilization of and expenditure on prescription drugs among
elderly patients. We also expect Part D to impact expenditures on other medical care services,
and ultimately patients’ health status.
2.3 Literature Review
2.3.1 Prescribing Behavior
Past literature has demonstrated that prescription decisions are associated with patients’ insur-
ance status and illness severity, as well as physician and practice characteristics. Studies suggest
that physicians play an important role in determining how many and what types of prescription
drugs patients receive. Tamblyn et al. (2003) study the prescribing activity of Quebec physicians
under the universal health program in Canada to see if physician or practice characteristics are
associated with the utilization of new drugs. They find that physician sex, specialty, practice
location, visit volume and the proportion of elderly in the physician’s practice all influence the
utilization of new drugs. Hellerstein (1998) posits that physicians are important agents in the
decision-making process of whether patients get generic or trade-name versions of drugs, and
finds that very little of the variation in prescription drugs received can be explained by patients’
characteristics.
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As discussed earlier, physicians are not directly reimbursed by insurance companies for pre-
scribing drugs; however, they are expected to act in the interest of patients when prescribing.
Blomqvist (1991) examines the patient/physician relationship and suggests that physicians are
“double agents”, representing both patients and insurers’ interest. They act more in the interest
of patients under fee-for-services plans and more in the interest of insurers under health mainte-
nance organization (HMO) plans. Lundin (2000) expands the analysis based on the Blomqvist
model, and studies situation where there are no incentives to act in the interest of patients or
insurers. He finds that physicians will consider patients’ interests more in this situation, and they
are less likely to prescribe trade-name versions of drugs to patients who have to pay a large sum
out-of-pocket. This lends some credibility to our results. Physicians may also change their behav-
ior in response to Part D if they receive more medications from pharmaceutical representatives
(PRs) after the introduction of Part D. 8
2.3.2 Medicare Part D Studies
There is a previous body of literature that analyzes the effect of Medicare Part D on patients’ out-
of-pocket costs and the utilization of prescription drugs, usually employing difference-in-difference
(DD) methods. Lichtenberg and Sun (2007), Yin et al.(2008) and Ketcham and Simon (2008)
use DD to analyze the effect of Part D with prescription claims data from national pharmacy
chains. Lichtenberg and Sun (2007) focus on the period from September 2004 to December 2006
and find that Medicare Part D reduces OOP daily cost of therapy by 18.4 percent, and increases
number of days of therapy by about 12.8 percent in 2006 compared to those for non-elderly users.
They also estimate that every seven prescriptions paid for by the government results in only two
additional prescriptions used, which means the crowd out rate is around 72%. Yin et al. (2008)
choose the near elderly group (those aged 60-63 year old) as the reference group. They find a
5.9% increase in the monthly average utilization and 13.1% decrease in monthly OOP cost after
the penalty free period (i.e., after June 2006). Ketcham and Simon (2008) compare outcomes for
those who are always eligible for Medicare (over 66 as of 2007) to a control group of those always
8Lurie et al. (1990) conducted a survey among internal medicine facilities in seven large mid-western teaching
hospitals and house staff from two of teaching programs and find that frequent contact with PRs is associated with
changes in prescribing behavior.
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ineligible for Medicare (58-64 as of 2007). They estimate an effect with similar magnitudes, that
days’ supply and number of individual prescriptions filled increase by 8.1% and 4.8% respectively,
and OOP costs fall by 17.2% for the eligible group in the first year after Part D. Engelhardt and
Gruber (2011) and Liu et al. (2011) study the topic with Medical Expenditure Panel Survey data
as well as the DD strategy and find that Part D has a relatively small impact on OOP spending
(Engelhardt and Gruber, 2011), and is associated with a $179.86 reduction in OOP cost and an
increase of 2.05 prescriptions per patient year (Liu et al., 2011).
Kaestner and Khan (2012) focus on Medicare beneficiaries aged 65 years and older. They
used an instrumental variable method by exploiting plausibly exogenous changes in prescription
drug coverage engendered by Medicare Part D. Their study finds that getting drug coverage is
associated with an approximately 70% increase in the use of prescription drugs for the general
population of elderly from 65 to 85 years old, and a 60% increase in the use of prescription drugs
for those with chronic conditions.
Another empirical strategy used to examine the effect of Part D on the utilization and out-
of-pocket costs of prescription drugs is time-series analysis. Briesacher et al. (2011) simulated
post-Part D outcomes using time-series regressions with a first-order autoregressive correlation
structure and pre-Part D data. Comparing simulated with observed results, they conclude that
average prescription fills per person increased significantly by 1.8 fills in 2006 and 3.4 fills in 2007,
compared to a 0.9 fill increase per year before Part D. They also found that average OOP drug
costs decrease significantly in both 2006 and 2007, by $143 and $148 per year respectively.
Other papers examine the effect of Part D in the pharmaceutical market. Duggan and Morton
(2010) provide evidence of the effect of Medicare Part D on the prices and utilization of branded
drugs. They analyze data on top-selling brands and find that drugs with high pre-Part D Medicare
market share experience a significantly lower average price increase than other brands, and an
increase in utilization. Combined with the fact that Part D lowers the fraction of drug prices paid
by beneficiaries; the average cost of prescription drugs for a Medicare recipient with average drug
spending decreases substantially. There are additional price declines in the second and third year
that appear to have reversed by the fourth year (2009) (Duggan and Morton, 2011).
Few studies examine the impact of Part D on the utilization or expenditure of health care
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services other than prescription drugs, and conclusions are not consistent amongst them. Engel-
hardt and Gruber (2011) and Liu et al. (2011) find almost no cost offset effects in other medical
spending, such as expenditures for inpatient, outpatient and emergency room visits. Similarly,
Kaestner and Khan (2012) find that Part D does not reduce inpatient stays or outpatient visits,
nor does it improves patient health status, and conclude that Part D is not likely to produce a
net gain. On the other side, Zhang et al. (2009) compare three groups of Medicare beneficiaries
with no or limited coverage before the implementation of Part D and that enroll in a Part D
plan afterwards, with a control group which had stable, uncapped drug coverage. Compared to
the control group, the increase in the total monthly drug spending is higher, while the monthly
medical expenditure is lower for the new enrollees, suggesting some offset effects.
2.3.3 Contributions of This Paper Compared to Past Literature
We improve upon previous literature on four dimensions. First, most previous studies uses DD
(Lichtenberg and Sun, 2007; Yin et al., 2008; Ketcham and Simon, 2008; Engelhardt and Gruber,
201; Liu et al., 2011). These studies estimate the effect of Part D policy by comparing changes in
outcomes for elderly beneficiaries before and after 2006 relative to changes for patients who are
under age 65. This potentially raises questions about the internal validity of their identification,
because by using the DD strategy, they assume that outcomes of the elderly group are comparable
with those of the non-elderly group in the absence of Medicare Part D. This is a strong assumption,
and may not be valid in the context of utilization of prescription drugs. For example, physicians
may have different prescribing patterns for older patients as they are also generally sicker than
younger patients. Thus, we adopt an improved empirical strategy by combining DD with a
regression discontinuity design. A regression discontinuity (RD) design allows prescribing pattern
to be different for elderly patients compared to non-elderly patients both before and after the
policy adoption year. Researchers are able to estimate the causal relationship between the policy
and health care outcomes by measuring the discrete jump in outcomes at the age cut-off for
treatment eligibility among patients within a narrow age range. By combining the DD and RD
specifications, we are essentially comparing the change in the discontinuity at the age 65 cut-off
before and after the adoption of Part D, which allows us to identify the effect of Part D without
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confounding discontinuities produced by such conditions as the fact that individuals also become
eligible for Medicare Part A and Part B when they turn age 65.
Second, few studies consider whether patients might have anticipated the upcoming Part D
policy in the years prior to 2006 and reduced their utilization of prescription drugs temporarily.
The MMA was signed into law in December 2003, but Part D was not implemented until Jan
1, 2006. Given the two year gap between announcement and implementation, patients, as well
as their physicians, could have had anticipatory behaviors. However, most past literature utilize
data within a narrow window starting from late 2004 or early 2005, and measure the effect of
Part D assuming the sample of patients before 2006 would have experienced a similar trend as the
sample after 2006 in the absence of the Part D policy. The only study we are aware of considering
anticipatory effects is by Alpert (2011), who studied the impact of anticipation of Medicare Part
D on drug utilization. They find that individuals defer drug use to the time period with subsidized
coverage. After accounting for these anticipatory effects, the Part D effect decreased by about
half. This suggests an upward bias in the estimated Part D effect in previous literature. Our study
provides further evidence of anticipatory behavior and tests the size of this effect by comparing
the estimated effects with and without samples in the anticipation year 2005.
Third, few studies examine the impact of Part D on physician behavior. The introduction
of Part D is one of the most significant changes in public health insurance policy since the
introduction of the Medicare and Medicaid programs in the 1960s, and the implementation of
Part D in 2006 significantly increased federal spending. The impact of Part D on physicians’
behavior is pertinent since physicians are critical in deciding the number and kind of prescription
drugs patients receive. We also examined the effects on expenditures on other medical care services
and patient health outcomes in order to test whether a cost offset effect exists or not.
Finally, we use different data. Some past literature studies the effect of Part D using pharmacy
chain claims data, but even though these data sets have rich detail on drug characteristics and
payment information, they only represent the sample of patients who had one or more prescription
filled during the sample period. Estimating the effect of Part D on patients who have at least
one prescription filled may bias the effect of Part D policy upward. And there is a strong chance
that the datasets are not nationally representative. In contrast to these studies, we use data from
CHAPTER 2. MEDICARE PART D PROGRAM 50
the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey. It is a nationally representative sample of visits
to non-federally employed office-based physicians in the U.S. It allows us to identify the discrete
jump in the number or types of drugs prescribed at the age 65 cutoff before and after year 2006.
We take advantage of knowing the specific date of birth of patients and the date of visit, and
model the relationship between age and drug prescribing using a flexible polynomial in age that
can take different forms for patients under and over age 65, and before and after 2006. Also, we
use NAMCS data through 2009, allowing us to examine longer-term effects of Part D on physician
behavior compared to previous literature.
2.4 Data
We compile our samples from four different sources. Our main analyses use the National Ambu-
latory Medical Care Surveys (NAMCS) for 2002-04 and 2006-09 and the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) Orange Book database to estimate the impact of Medicare Part D on physicians’
prescribing patterns.9 The NAMCS is conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics and
collects data on a nationally representative sample of visits to non-federally employed office-based
physicians in the U.S. excluding radiologists, anesthesiologists, and pathologists. A multistage
probability sample design is used to select physicians for interview; this design is described else-
where (Bryant and Shimizu 1988). Each physician is then randomly assigned to a one-week
reporting period. During this period, data for a systematic random sample of about 30 visits are
recorded for each physician. Physicians and patients may be selected multiple times but there is
no identification number to link them longitudinally. (We exclude the year 2005 from the main
analysis because of the possible existence of anticipatory effects, which we will explain in detail
later.) Each physician is asked to record information on up to eight drugs (six in 2002) that
were ordered, supplied, administered or continued during the visit. Prescription drugs, over-the-
counter drugs, immunizations, allergy shots, anesthetics, chemotherapy, and dietary supplements
are included.
9FDA orange book database contains information on the date of FDA approval, and applica-
tion type by drug name for drugs approved since January 1, 1982. Application type can be
NDA or ANDA which indicate whether it is a brand-name drug or generic drug, respectively (
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ucm129689.htm).
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We merge the earliest date of FDA approval for the active ingredient contained in the drug
and application type onto the NAMCS data using the drug name.10 We do this because there
are no consistent variables to identify the drugs in both the NAMCS data and FDA data .
Excluding over-the-counter drugs, the merge rate was around 95%. Most of the non-merges are
drugs approved prior to 1982.
We first construct the visit level sample where we examine prescribing patterns measured by
number of prescription drugs, number of generic drugs , number of branded drugs, number of
over-the-counter (OTC) drugs, total number of drugs prescribed, and any drugs prescribed.11
There are 27,983 visit records for patients aged 60-69 years old in the NAMCS for the sample
period 2002-04 and 2006-09. We limit the sample to 26,474 visits, excluding 1,509 (5.39%) visits
among patients who have missing information on any variable used in the analyses. 12
We also use prescription-level data to examine the effect of Part D on the age of the active
ingredients of prescription drugs physicians prescribe to their patients. For drugs with different
manufactures or strengths or packages, we use the earliest date of approval. (The NAMCS data
contain no information on dosage.) We examine the effect of the introduction of Medicare Part D
on the age of active ingredient among prescription drugs approved since 1982. Our prescription-
level sample has 54,132 observations for those aged 60-69.
The NAMCS data also includes information on patients’ demographic characteristics such
as gender, race, disease categories defined by ICD-9 codes, and on physician characteristics like
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) status, whether it is a solo practice or not, adoption of elec-
tronic medical records, specialty categories, and state of practice. We control for these variables
as baseline covariates in our specification.
We then analyze Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) 2002-04 and 2006-09 to estimate
the effect of Part D on patients’ actual utilization of and expenditure on prescription drugs, as
well as expenditure on other health care services. MEPS is a nationally representative set of
10See appendix for the description of merging FDA data with NAMCS data.
11Generic drugs are identified by the variable, “application type” from FDA orange book data set: application
type “A” indicates generic drug, application type “N” indicates brand-name drugs.
12One of the control variable, percent of revenue from Medicare patients, is imputed for 6.29 percent of the
sample. Imputation was done with a tobit model controlling for physician specialty dummies, percent of patients
aged 65 and over, and percent of the county population aged 65 and over (for the county where the physician
practices).
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respondents drawn from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS). It is a two-year panel
that contains information on number of prescriptions filled, total expenditure for prescription
drugs, and expenditure for drugs from different sources such as self pay, Medicare, Medicaid or
private sources. We also examine outcomes such as expenditures on all medical care services,
inpatient, outpatient, office or emergency room services, as well as self reported health status. As
for independent variables, we control patients’ gender, race/ethnicity, poverty category, census
region, MSA status, education level, marital status, and prior health conditions (whether the
individual has certain types of chronic conditions) including asthma, high blood pressure, angina,
heart attack, joint pain, stroke, emphysema, arthritis or other heart disease. After excluding
observations with any missing information on the variables we use, we are left with 276,774
observations for the group of respondents 60-69 years old.
The last data set we study is the Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS), which is part of the
Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP). It is the largest publicly available all-payer
inpatient care database in the United States, and containing a twenty percent stratified sample
of all discharges from U.S. community hospitals. We use the Prevention Quality Indicators (PQI)
module developed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). PQIs identify
hospital admissions that may have been avoided through access to high-quality outpatient care
or patient adherence to treatment recommendations. The primary reasons for discharge consid-
ered avoidable by this module include diabetes short-term complications, perforated appendix,
diabetes long-term complications, COPD or asthma in older adults, hypertension, heart failure,
dehydration, bacterial pneumonia, urinary tract infection, angina without procedure, uncontrolled
diabetes, lower-extremity amputation diabetes. We examine outcomes such as the incidence of
admissions due to each one of these conditions, admission due to any one of these conditions,
in-hospital mortality, length of stay and total charges in order to study the effect of Part D on
quality of ambulatory care service, as well as measures of quality and cost of inpatient stays. We
control for patient characteristics such as gender, whether admission is during a weekend, elective
or through emergency department, whether the patient is transferred from another hospital, and
Clinical Classification Software (CCS) categories (Elixhauser et al., 2013); we also include hospital
characteristics such as bed size, ownership, urban or rural hospital, teaching status and quartile
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of median family income at the zip code level. There are 4,770,572 discharge records for patients
between age 60 and 69 years old. After excluding patients with missing information on any of the
variables we use as independent variables, we have 4,525,332 observations in our final sample.
2.5 Empirical Strategy
We now discuss the empirical strategy we use to analyze the causal effect of Part D on prescribing
patterns, utilization and expenditure of prescription drugs, and on health outcomes. In this sec-
tion, we will present popular estimation strategies from past literature first, discuss the weakness
of these approaches, and then propose the regression specification developed from past strategies
we employ.
As we discussed in Section 3, the most popular empirical strategy utilized in the past is the
difference-in-difference (DD) approach. A DD approach normally defines those eligible for Part D
or those with Part D coverage as the “treatment group”, and those ineligible for Part D or those
without Part D coverage as the “control group”. The idea is to compare the outcome changes for
the treatment group before and after the treatment (Meyer, 1994), i.e., the introduction of Part
D in 2006, with those of the control group before and after the treatment. In the context of this
paper, we would estimate the effect of policy by exploiting the relative changes in prescription drug
utilization by elderly patients who visit physicians’ office before and after Jan 1, 2006, compared
to those of near-elderly patients who visit physicians’ office before and after Jan 1, 2006. The
typical estimation equation is:
Outcomeij = β0 + β1 × 1(age >= 65)i + β2 × 1(year >= 2006)j
+ β3 × 1(age >= 65)i × 1(year >= 2006)j + β4Xi + β5Yj + β6State+ ij , (2.1)
where Outcomeij is the outcome (number of prescription drugs, number of generic drugs, number
of brand-name drugs and etc.) for patient i by physician j, 1(age >= 65)i is an indicator for
whether the patient i is over 65 years old, and the variable 1(year >= 2006)i is an indicator
variable for whether the visit takes place on or after January 1, 2006. The specification includes
control variables for patient characteristics, Xi (which are patient attributes including gender,
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race, year of the visit took place and dummies for the major diagnostic category associated
with the visit), physician practice characteristics, Yj (which are characteristics of the physician
or practice including specialty of the physician,13 whether the physician is in solo practice or
uses electronic medical records, and whether the practice is within a metropolitan statistical area
(MSA), percentage of revenue from Medicare patients) and state fixed effects State, which control
for any time-invariant characteristics of physician practice patterns in different states. The DD
estimator is β3 and Equation (1) is estimated by ordinary least squares.
14
A weakness of the DD approach is that it assumes that trends in prescribing patterns are the
same for both the treatment and control groups throughout the analysis period so that the DD
estimator can identify only the effect of Part D. However, trends in prescribing patterns are likely
to be different by patient age, making it likely that prescribing patterns may differ for treatment
and control groups.15 The DD approach used in past literature took this difference into account
somewhat by limiting the sample to a narrow age range, but it does not really address the issue
or verify the validity of the basic assumption. Additionally, because of the anticipation effect we
discussed above, the validity of this assumption is even more questionable.
The second empirical approach, more popular among recent policy analyses, is to use a regres-
sion discontinuity (RD) design. Card et al., (2009) uses this approach to identify the impact of
Medicare. The main idea is to compare the immediate change in outcomes for patients that are
just before and after the age 65 threshold with only data from after policy adoption. A general
model using the RD design is:
Outcomeij = β0 + β1 × 1(age >= 65)i + β2f(Agei) + β3f(Daysi) + β4Xi + β5Yj
+ β6State+ ij , (2.2)
where f(Agei) is a flexible polynomial function of patients’ ages (measured by days from/to his
13Internal Medicine, Pediatrics, General Surgery, Obstetrics & Gynecology, Orthopedic Surgery, Cardiovascu-
lar Diseases, Dermatology, Urology, Psychiatry, Neurology, Ophthalmology, Otolaryngology, or Other specialties
relative to General/Family Practice.
14We also estimate the model using Generalized Least Square (GLM) regressions and present results in Appendix
Tables. The results are essentially similar with what we have from OLS regressions.
15We calculate the number of prescription and generic drugs prescribed by physicians by age group and perform
Wald test to examine whether there is a statistically significant difference between means of outcomes between
pair-wise age groups, and p-values from results reject the null hypothesis that means are equal.
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or her 65th birthday), and/or its interaction term with an age 65 dummy. f(Daysi) is a flexible
polynomial function patients’s visit date (measured by days from January 1st, 2002 which is the
start of our sample period) and its interaction term with year 2006 dummy. β1 is an estimate of
the causal effect of the Part D policy on outcomes. According to Lee and Lemieux (2010), the key
assumption for the RD design is that assignment to either side of the discontinuity threshold is as
good as random. In order to satisfy this underlying assumption, Card et al. (2009) narrows the
analysis sample to elderly patients with ages just before and after 65, or select “non-deferrable
conditions” (unplanned admission through the emergency room with very similar weekend and
weekday admission rates) to address sample selection bias.
It would be ideal to adopt the RD specification and estimate the discontinuity in observed
outcomes at the age 65 cutoff. Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, there is a confounding policy
discontinuity at the age 65 cutoff. Individuals will be eligible for Part D when they turn 65 years
old after year 2006. At the same time, other insurance characteristics change abruptly at age 65
because of the onset of eligibility for Medicare Parts A and B. That is, elderly individuals become
eligible for coverage of inpatient and outpatient services under the traditional Medicare program
at age 65. Card et al. (2009) show that there is a 65-percentage point increase in Medicare
coverage at age 65, and about a nine percentage point increase in the fraction of people with any
coverage. Thus, the eligibility cut-off criteria for original Medicare and Part D are the same, both
at age 65 years old. If we still adopt am RD specification to analyze the effect of Part D, it will
violate the RD assumption that potential outcomes are continuous in the absence of treatment,
and it would be difficult to disentangle the impact of Part D policy from the impact of changes in
Medicare or health insurance availability generally. Thus, we introduce a new empirical strategy
to estimate the effect of Part D in the section below in order to control for the potential impact
on outcomes from the eligibility for coverage of inpatient and outpatient services under Medicare
when patients turn 65.
2.5.1 DD-RD Identification and Estimation Strategy
In this paper, we propose an empirical approach which combines the DD and RD approaches
(we call this specification DD-RD hereafter), in order to identify the average treatment effect of
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Medicare Part D when implemented on January 1, 2006 for individuals aged 65 and over.
The DD-RD design enables us to identify the treatment effect while addressing the internal
validity issue. The intuition is that the confounding policy, which is Medicare program eligibility
at 65 years old, is time-invariant in the sample period. We can estimate this discontinuity prior to
adoption of Part D, and subtract that effect from the estimated discontinuity after the adoption
of Part D. As long as the discontinuity resulting from the confounding policy is constant, we can
address the confounding issue using the DD-RD specification.
The identification strategy we present here requires milder assumptions compared to either
the RD or the DD specifications. We do not require that treatment and control groups experience
the same trend in outcomes in the absence of policy adoption, nor do we require that all other
variables to be continuous across the age 65 threshold. According to Grembi et al. (2011), the
only two assumptions required by this specification are: 1, the confounding discontinuities must
be time-invariant. This is equivalent to the RD condition about continuity of potential outcomes;
and 2, the treatment effect and the confounding effect are additive. This is equivalent to the
additivity conditions in the DD specification.
To formally estimate the discontinuities in outcomes beginning in 2006 for those aged 65 to
69 compared to those aged 60 to 64 using this approach, we estimate the following equation:
Outcomeij = β0 +β1× 1(age >= 65)i +β2× f(Agei) +β3× 1(age >= 65)i× 1(year >= 2006)i
+ β4 × 1(year >= 2006)i + β5 × f(Daysi) + β6Xi + β7Yj + β8State+ ij . (2.3)
Additional control variables include: Xi (which are patient attributes including gender, race, year
of the visit took place and dummies for the major diagnostic category associated with the visit);
Yj , (which are characteristics of the physician or practice including specialty of the physician,
16
whether the physician is in solo practice or uses electronic medical records, whether the practice is
within a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and percentage of revenue from Medicare patients);
and State, state fixed effects which control for any time-invariant characteristics of physician
16Internal Medicine, Pediatrics, General Surgery, Obstetrics & Gynecology, Orthopedic Surgery, Cardiovascu-
lar Diseases, Dermatology, Urology, Psychiatry, Neurology, Ophthalmology, Otolaryngology, or Other specialties
relative to General/Family Practice.
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practice patterns in different states. All analyses use sample weights, and standard errors account
for the complex design of the NAMCS survey, the MEPS data and the NIS-HCUP data using
Stata software version 12 (Stata-Corp, College Station, Texas).
In order to best model trends in physician prescribing patterns by patients’ age, we take
advantage of the exact dates of birth in the NAMCS data.17 Accordingly, Agei is the number of
days measured by a patient’s age at visit from/to their 65th birthday. We includef(Age)i, which
is a flexible polynomial function of Agei fully interacted with age 65 and year 2006 dummies. By
including f(Age)i, we allow prescribing pattern and other outcomes to take different forms on
either side of the age 65 cutoff before and after year 2006. Our base specification uses a cubic
form for age in the analysis for NAMCS data, and a linear function in the analysis of MEPS data
and and NIS-HCUP data.18
Daysi is the number of days since December 31, 2001, the start of our sample period. By
including f(Days)i, which is a flexible polynomial function of Days and their interaction terms
with year 2006 dummy, we are able to model the trend for outcomes flexibly before and after
January 1, 2006. We utilize exact dates of visits in the NAMCS data and measure the number
of days since the start of our sample period. This enables us to more precisely model trends
in physician prescribing patterns over time, while allowing the discrete change at the time of
adoption of the policy.
Under the identifying assumption that other determinants of prescribing patterns are contin-
uous at the age 65 cutoff (defined by whether or not patients have passed their 65th birthday
when they visit the physician) both before and after year 2006, the coefficient of the interaction
of the age 65 dummy and the year 2006 dummy, β3 in Equation (3) will be an unbiased DD-RD
estimate of the effect of Part D on outcomes.
In addition to visit-level regressions, we also perform prescription-level regressions to see if
the age of the active ingredient contained in drugs prescribed by physicians changed beginning in
17We don’t have the specific date of birth in MEPS and NIS-HCUP data, so the age functions in the estimations
for those two datasets only have age in years information.
18We decide the order of polynomial for the function of age using two methods. We compare the goodness-of-fit
among specifications with different order of polynomial function according to Lee and Lemieux (2009). We also
adopt Wald test to examine the joint significance of additional polynomial terms. The results for both tests will be
presented in the table along with regression results with the order of polynomial terms chosen by both methods, in
order to check the robustness of our results.
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2006. The DD-RD specification of the regression is similar with Equation (3):
Age Drugijk = β0+β1×1(age >= 65)i+β2 ∗f(Agei)+β3×1(age >= 65)i×1(year >= 2006)i
+ β4 × 1(year >= 2006)i + β5 × f(Daysi) + β6Xi + β7Yj + β8Dk + β9State+ ij , (2.4)
where the dependent variable Age Drugijk is the age of the active ingredient contained in the drug
measured in months between time of visit to the physicians’ office and date of FDA approval. We
include all controls from Equation (3), also add fixed effects for primary drug class categories, Dk.
One issue with the data is that the FDA orange book database assigns the value of “Prior to Jan
1, 1982” to drugs approved before 1982. For this reason, we utilize censored normal regression for
the prescription-level analysis with the outcome of age of drugs prescribed, allowing the censoring
value to vary from observation to observation.
We test the validity of the RD specification and the robustness of results in many ways. First,
we check the density of running variables around the age 65 cutoff before and after year 2006 in
order to test whether the eligibility criteria is manipulated around threshold or not (McCrary,
2008). Second, we estimate specifications using different age bandwidths and different orders of
polynomial functions of ages, with and without baseline covariates. Third, we implement the
DD-RD specification with baseline covariates as outcomes to validate the basic assumption of the
DD-RD specification that all underlying characteristics are smooth around the age 65 threshold in
the absence of the treatment. Fourth, placebo DD-RD estimation is implemented at an arbitrary
cutoff defined as 64 year old and over.
2.6 Main Results: Effect of Part D on Physicians’ Prescribing
Patterns
We discuss the main results in this section. We first present graphical evidence of the impact
of Part D on physician prescribing behavior with NACMS data. Then we estimate how much
Part D affected physicians’ prescribing patterns for elderly patients after the adoption of Part D
policy, and how anticipatory effects might cause overestimates of the true effect. We also show
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how other practice patterns change in the physician office visit setting.
2.6.1 Graphical Evidence
Figure 2.1 plots the mean for the number of prescription drugs prescribed by physicians by age
per quarter, as well as fitted age profiles from regressions that include cubic terms in age (in days
from/to 65 year old birthday), and full interactions with age 65 and year 2006 dummies. There
is a small but noticeable decrease in the number of drugs that physicians prescribe to patients
when patients turn 65 years old for the sample of 2002-04. For the sample after the adoption of
Part D policy, the average number of prescription drugs prescribed per patient increased from 2.4
scripts for non-elderly patients, to around 2.7 scripts when they turn 65 years old.
Figure 2.2 shows the mean for the number of generic drugs physicians prescribe per quarter
by age and fitted age profiles from regressions with cubic function of age for each side of age 65
and year 2006 cutoff. There is no discernible jump in the outcome from below age 65 to above
age 65 before policy adoption, but the average number of generic drugs prescribed to patients
increases from 0.9 scripts to over 1.2 scripts, roughly a 0.3 script increase after policy adoption.
2.6.2 Estimates of the Effect of Part D on the Prescribing Pattern and Antic-
ipatory Effect
In the top panel of Table 2.1, we summarize regression estimates of the change in the number
of prescription drugs and in the number of generic drugs prescribed.19 The first column is the
DD-RD specification without any baseline covariates, allowing for cubic functions of age on either
side of the age 65 and year 2006 cutoffs. The coefficient of the interaction term between the
age 65 dummy and year 2006 dummy is positive and significant, which indicates that there is a
0.61 script increase for the elderly patients relative to nonelderly patients after adoption of the
Part D policy. We then separate the 2002-04 sample and 2006-09 sample, and run a conventional
RD regression with each sample. The results are listed in the second and third column of the
top panel. The coefficient of interest for the regression of the sample after 2006 is positive and
19We perform GLM regression with log link and Gaussian distribution, which is determined by Park test. Results
are summarized in Appendix Table C.5. The significance of results from OLS regression still hold and the calculated
marginal effects are similar with what we have from OLS regressions.
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significant, implying that there is a 0.3 script increase for elderly patients. The increase is similar
in magnitude with that of the discontinuity from Figure 2.1. For the 2002-04 sample, the RD
coefficient is negative with a magnitude of 0.29 scripts. This implies that before the adoption of
the Part D policy, the number of drugs prescribed at physician visits discontinuously decreased
at age 65. The coefficient may reflect the fact that elderly patients were likely to lose their
prescription drug coverage from employer sponsored insurance or other public/private coverage
at age 65. Subtracting the estimated effect for the sample before 2006 from that for the sample
after 2006, we have a 0.6 script change for the elderly relative to nonelderly patients after the
adoption of Part D.
In the fourth column, the estimated DD-RD coefficient after controlling for baseline covariates
is slightly lower compared to the estimate without controls, but still significant with a 0.56 script
increase. This provides support for the assumption that there are no other changes occurring at
age 65 in 2006 that are confounding our analysis. This confirms our observation from Figure 2.1,
that physicians increase their prescriptions to elderly patients on average by 33 percent (calculated
with 0.5625 divided by 1.5995, the mean for number of prescription drugs for non-elderly patients
before 2006 from Appendix Table C.1) after the adoption of Part D, compared to their non-
elderly patients. The coefficient on the interaction term is still significant if we change the order
of the polynomial function of age to a quadruple in column (5). Consistent results across different
specifications imply that the estimated effect is robust to various functional forms of age, and the
significance of coefficients is not an artifact of how we specify the age control function.
Columns (6) - (10) summarize results for the number of generic drugs prescribed. In the
top panel, the estimated result for the regression with a cubic function of age is positive and
significant, indicating an increase of 0.26 script on average. This is similar to the magnitude of
increase in Figure 2.2. We also get similar results with regressions on the 2006-09 sample, using
the DD-RD specification with controls and with higher order polynomial functions of age. This
indicates that physicians are likely to increase the number of generic drugs prescribed to elderly
relative to nonelderly patients after the adoption of Part D policy by 55 percent (calculated with
0.2556 divided by 0.4676, the mean of number of generic drugs prescribed for non-elderly patients
before 2006).
CHAPTER 2. MEDICARE PART D PROGRAM 61
The bottom panel of Table 2.1 presents corresponding regression results for the sample that
includes patients visiting physician offices in 2005. In the bottom panel, we can see that the
magnitudes of effects from the estimation of the DD-RD specification, with or without baseline
covariates, are all greater than those in the top panel. After stratifying the sample according to
the year 2006 cutoff and running separate regressions on the sample before and after year 2006,
we find that the estimated effect for the sample before 2006 is negative and significant for number
of prescription drugs. Comparing results in the second column from the bottom panel to that in
the top panel, we believe the difference comes from the decrease in the number of prescription
drugs for elderly patients in 2005. Elderly patients and their physicians anticipate the upcoming
Part D policy, and postpone or reduce the number of prescriptions until the time when patients
get their Part D coverage, a result also documented in Alpert (2011). We test the difference
between coefficients from the top and the bottom panels using Wald test, in order to examine the
existence of an anticipatory effect in the year just before the adoption of Part D policy. The results
of tests are summarized in the table and p-values rejects the null hypothesis that two coefficients
are equal, which indicate the existence of anticipatory effect. After including the 2005 sample in
the regression, our estimate that Part D results in physicians increasing the prescription of drugs
for elderly patients by 44 percent, which is a more than 35 percent greater than the effect from
our previous DD-RD estimation. This effect is similar to the size of the anticipatory effect found
in Alpert (2011). There is also weak evidence that this effect also exists for the prescription of
generic drugs, but the estimate is not precise.
2.6.3 Estimates of the Effect of Part D on Other Practicing Patterns in the
Physician’s Office
We estimate the effect of Part D on practice patterns other than prescribing prescription drugs in
the office setting. Again, we utilize the DD-RD specification with cubic and quadruple functions
of age. Results are summarized in Table 2.2, those with a cubic polynomial of age profiles are in
the top panel, and those with quadruple polynomial of age profiles are in the bottom panel.
Estimation of the results in the first, second and last columns reveals no evidence of change
in any prescription drugs and in the number of brand-name drugs prescribed for elderly patients
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after the Part D policy. However, physicians write 0.16-0.24 fewer scripts for OTC drugs for
their elderly relative to nonelderly patients after 2006. This is a 51-77 percent effect, considering
physicians make 0.31 prescriptions for OTC drugs to non-elderly patients on average before 2006.
However, if we compare the magnitude of the coefficients to that of the increase in the number of
prescription drugs from the previous regressions, we see a smaller decrease in absolute terms. This
implies that the total number of drugs physicians prescribe for their elderly patients increases.
The fourth column of Table 2.2 provides weak evidence that the total number of drug prescribed
increases, although the effect is not precisely estimated.
Appendix Figures C.1-C.7 plot the age profiles for these outcomes separately for the 2002-04
sample and the 2006-09 sample, and provides evidence that increases our confidence in the sign
and magnitudes of regression coefficients we record in Table 2.2.
We also examined the effect of Part D on the number of tests conducted in the physicians’
office, patients’ time spent with their doctor and the age of active ingredients for prescription
drugs.20 These outcomes are complementary measures of treatment intensity in a doctor’s visit.
The age of active ingredients for prescription drugs is analogous with physicians’ adoption of
technology, i.e. “younger” drug physicians prescribe, newer technology they adopt in treating
their patients. We didn’t find any significant results for these three outcomes with either cubic or
quadruple polynomials in age as controls, which indicate that physicians do not change treatment
pattern for their elderly patients in these other ways when they learn their elderly patients are
more likely to have drug coverage.
2.7 Validity of Specifications and Robustness Check
In this section, we test the assumptions of the DD-RD specification, and perform sensitivity
analyses in order to check the robustness of our main results.
First, we graphically examine whether there is evidence of sample selection bias. Sample
selection bias is a major threat to identification with the RD design, because the estimated effect
may reflect the change in the composition of sample, not the effect from the policy adoption itself.
20For this outcome, we estimate the specification with the prescription level data with one prescription as one
observation.
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In our context, if the sample selections before and after age 65 cut-off are different for the sample
before 2006 and after 2006, it will bias our estimates of DD-RD specification. Figure 2.3 shows
both scatter plots and fitted cubic age polynomial regression results in order to validate the null
hypothesis of continuity of the age profile at the age 65 cutoff for the 2002-04 sample and 2006-09
sample. If patients were less likely to go to physicians’ office just before they become eligible for
the Part D coverage, and more likely to go after they become eligible, our estimates would suffer
from selection bias. Figure 2.3 supports our assumption and shows no sign of such bias. There
is not much difference in visit density at the age 65 cutoff between the 2002-04 sample and the
2006-09 sample. As a matter of fact, patients have little incentive to change their frequency of
visits to physicians’ office because elderly patients are always eligible for Medicare coverage of
physician visits, while non-elderly patients are never eligible for Medicare coverage of physician
visits.
Second, we check whether baseline covariates are smoothly distributed across the age 65 cutoffs
for both samples before and after 2006 as a further test for another possible type of selection bias.
We estimate a DD-RD specified model with the baseline covariates as outcome variables. Results
are summarized in Table 2.7. All but one variable show no differential jump at the age 65 cutoffs
between the two time periods. The coefficient for the race indicator, i.e., the nonwhite dummy, is
only significant at 10%, and exclusion of this variable does not affect our basic results in the main
analyses. These results further validate our assumption for the DD-RD specification and reduces
the possibility of omitted variable bias.
Next, we test the robustness of our main results by estimating the DD-RD model using
different bandwidths with and without baseline covariates. Results are summarized in Table 2.3.
We control for the different polynomial functions of age in the samples with different bandwidths.
In the first column, we control the linear age function for the sample with a bandwidth of one
year on each side of the age cutoff. In the second and third column, we use quadratic and cubic
age functions for the sample with a bandwidth of two years on each side. The fourth column
shows the result with a cubic age function for a bandwidth of three years. The fifth and sixth
column shows results with quadruple age functions and bandwidths of five and six years on each
side of the age 65 cutoff, respectively. The regression coefficients for the number of prescription
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drugs and the number of generic drugs, with or without baseline covariates, are all significantly
positive, with magnitude similar to those shown in Table 2.1. We conclude that adoption of Part
D causes physicians to prescribe more prescription drugs, especially more generic drugs for their
elderly patients when those patients turn 65.
Finally, we conduct an extensive set of placebo tests for the main analysis sample (age 60-
69), and for samples with varying bandwidths, to make sure that our results represent a causal
relationship instead of spurious correlations between Part D and outcomes. We set age 64 as the
cutoff and estimated the DD-RD specification with and without baseline covariates on all samples.
Results are summarized in Table 2.4. The results are statistically significant for only three out of
thirty two specifications, and the levels of significance are only at the 10 percent. This placebo
test further demonstrates the robustness of our main results.
2.8 Patient Utilization, Expenditure and Health Outcomes for
Other Medical Care Services
In this section, we extend the analysis from the early stages of the effect of Part D policy on
to later stages. The complete chain of how Part D affects the utilization of prescription drugs
starts when physicians change their prescribing patterns, and continues to where patients fill their
prescriptions at the pharmacy. Examination of the effect of Part D on patients’ actual utilization
of and expenditure on prescription drugs will give us an indication of whether patients comply
with the prescription or not, and of how large the effect of Part D on drug costs is. A later
stage in the chain is how elderly patients’ expenditure on other health care services, such as
inpatient, outpatient, and emergency room (ER) visits and health outcomes change after patients
change their consumption of prescription drugs. We are able to get measures of utilization of and
expenditures on prescription drugs as well as expenditures on other medical care services from
MEPS data, as well as patients’ inpatient health outcomes from NIS-HCUP data. We employ the
same DD-RD specification to examine the effect of Part D policy on these outcomes.21
We first examine the effect of Part D on patients’ actual utilization of and expenditure for
21We perform Two-Part regression for MEPS data with logged second part outcomes. Results are summarized
in Appendix Table C.6 and Appendix Table C.7. The significance of results from OLS regression still hold and the
calculated marginal effects are similar with what we have from OLS regressions.
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prescription drugs; these results are shown in Table 2.5. Although we don’t have specific date of
birth and date of visit in the MEPS data, we are still able to control for a polynomial function of
age in years. We get consistent results for all outcomes controlling for either a linear or quadratic
function of age. The number of prescription drugs increases by 8.3 to 11.8 scripts per year on
average, which means patients increase their utilization of prescription drugs by 39-55 percent
when they turn age 65 after the adoption of Part D compared to before the adoption. The total
expenditures on prescription drugs per individual per year and the expenditures on prescription
drugs from Medicare sources increase at the age 65 cutoff after 2006, although the coefficients for
the former outcome are not precisely estimated. OOP cost per script decreases slightly, and the
sign and magnitude of estimated effects are consistent with those in previous literature. However,
our effects are not significant. The insignificance of our results could partly result from insufficient
information in the public use version of the MEPS data to precisely estimate age profiles and
time trends of outcomes. We also find Part D is associated with decreases in expenditures on
prescription drugs from Medicaid and private sources.
We estimate the effect of Part D on expenditures on other medical care services with MEPS
data using the same specifications. Regression results are summarized in Table 2.6. We find no
evidence that Part D significantly affected total medical expenditures, expenditures for ER visits,
inpatient visits, outpatient visits, office visits, or self reported health status.
Table 2.8 presents results with stratified samples according to dual eligibility status, sex and
poverty categories. Previous research suggested that certain groups of Medicare beneficiaries are
more likely to be affected by Part D policy, such as dually eligible beneficiaries. Dual-eligible
beneficiaries were covered by Medicaid prescription drug coverage before 2006, and they are
automatically transferred to Part D plans after 2006. They are less affected by the adoption
of Part D policy than others because they are more likely to have coverage for drugs before
2006 compared to their non-dual eligible counterparts. After stratifying the sample according to
whether the individual is a dual or non-dual eligible individual and estimating effects separately,
we find significant results for the non-dual eligible group, but not the dual eligible group. The
other possibility is low-income beneficiaries. As we discussed earlier, low-income beneficiaries are
eligible for subsidies, which means they pay zero or reduced premiums, and they pay reduced
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co-pay for prescription drugs which they do get. We run DD-RD regression on the stratified
sample, and find only significant results for low-income and near poor individuals.22
Table 2.9 summarizes regression results from NIS-HCUP dataset. After controlling for a cubic
polynomial function of age, we do not find significant effects of Part D on the PQI measures,
in-hospital mortality, or charges or length of stay. This indicates that Part D does not have a
significant impact on inpatient PQIs or resource use.
2.9 Conclusion and Discussion
The Medicare Part D program was created since prescription drugs were proven to be more and
more effective in treating diseases, while drug expenditures were increasing quickly and out-of-
pocket cost for drugs was high. Part D decreases the percentage of elderly individuals without
drug coverage. It also lowers the cost of prescription drugs for others who before only had access
to plans with higher OOP cost. In this paper, we examined whether physicians will prescribe
more prescription drugs and more generic drugs for their elderly patients after 2006. We also
examined the change in other practice patterns such as number of tests ordered, the number of
OTC drugs prescribed, the number of brand-name drugs prescribed, the age of active ingredients
in prescription drugs, and the time spent with the physician during each visit to physicians’ office.
To estimate the effect of Part D, we employed a new empirical strategy combining the DD
and RD designs. Specifically, this new technique allows us to compare discrete jumps in outcomes
at the age 65 cutoff for the sample of patients who visited a physician’s office during in 2006-09
with that for the sample of patients visiting physicians’ office in 2002-04. The difference between
these two discontinuities is our estimate of Part D’s effect.
We find that Part D is associated with a 33% increase in the number of prescription drugs, and
a 55% increase in the number of generic drugs prescribed by physicians to their elderly patients, a
larger effect than those found by other Part D related studies. We think this is primarily because
we correct for internal validity issues caused by confounding treatments that likely bias previous
results. We did not find evidence of changes in other practice behaviors. However, we do find
22In MEPS data, low-income group is individuals with income between 125% to less than 200% of federal poverty
line, near poor group is individuals with income between 100% to less than 125% of federal poverty line.
CHAPTER 2. MEDICARE PART D PROGRAM 67
evidence for the existence of an anticipatory effect in 2005, the year before the implementation of
Part D policy. We perform a series of sensitivity analyses in order to support the validity of our
specification assumptions and the robustness of our results.
We believe the provision of formularies is one of many mechanisms through which Part D
policy leads to more prescriptions for generic drugs. Part D plans encourage the utilization of
generic drugs in each drug class by putting them on a tier with lower copayments. A recent report
by the Kaiser Family Foundation shows that the actual net Part D spending has been about 30
percent lower than the initial projections made by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in
2003 (Hoadley, 2012), and the report points out that higher utilization of generic drugs was one
of many explanations for this phenomenon.
Next, we adopt the same specification to study the impact of Part D on the utilization of and
expenditure on prescription drugs that were actually purchased by individuals. We find suggestive
evidence that Part D resulted in a 38% increase in the number of prescription drugs purchased.
Results also suggest that expenditures on prescription drugs increased but the OOP payment per
prescription decreases for elderly patients, but neither effect is precisely estimated.
We also study the effect of Part D on expenditures for other medical care services and health
outcomes for hospital patients. Expenditures for all medical services and for outpatient visits
increase when we add higher order polynomial functions of age as controls into the DD-RD
specification. However, we find no consistent evidence overall that shows significant changes in
expenditures for inpatient, outpatient or ER visits using various specifications; Nor did we find
any quality-improving effects of Part D on inpatient health outcomes as measured by mortality,
charge, and PQIs, results consistent with those of Kaestner and Khan (2012) and Engelhardt and
Gruber (2011).
Taken together, our results suggest that Part D resulted changed physicians’ prescribing pat-
terns by prescribing more prescription drugs and generic drugs, and by prescribing fewer OTC
drugs. However, Part D did not significantly affect expenditures for other health care services
or health outcomes. Thus, it may be then that the net impact of this program is fairly small
compared to its costs. However, we note a caveat to our findings. We did not examine the impact
of Part D policy on the supply side. Pharmaceutical companies might respond to the adoption of
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Part D by changing their marketing strategies; this mechanism may be responsible for changes in
physician prescribing behavior for the elderly relative to the near elderly beginning in 2006 rather
than physicians acting as agents for patients. Additionally, the pharmaceutical markets may also
experience changes in competitiveness among different drug classes, thus leading to changes in the
price of some prescription drugs (Duggan and Morton, 2010). Disentangling the possible reasons
for changes in physician prescribing behavior for elderly relative to nonelderly patients beginning
in 2006 is a possible direction for the future research.
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Figure 2.1: Number of Prescription Drugs Prescribed by Physicians at Each Visit, NAMCS
Samples are based on data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (2002-2004 and
2005-2009). The estimated discontinuities (and standard errors) at age 65 and the fitted lines are
from a regression with a cubic polynomial in age fully interacted with a dummy for age greater
than or equal to 65 and a dummy for year in or after 2006. Points represent means for people in
each age cell (measured in quarters).
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Figure 2.2: Number of Generic Drugs Prescribed by Physicians at Each Visit, NAMCS
Samples are based on data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (2002-2004 and
2005-2009). The estimated discontinuities (and standard errors) at age 65 and the fitted lines are
from a regression with a cubic polynomial in age fully interacted with a dummy for age greater
than or equal to 65 and a dummy for year in or after 2006. Points represent means for people in
each age cell (measured in quarters).
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Figure 2.3: Average Number of Visits to Physicians’ Office for Age in Month Cells, NAMCS
Samples are based on data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (2002-2004 and
2005-2009). The estimated discontinuities (and standard errors) at age 65 and the fitted lines are
from a regression with a cubic polynomial in age fully interacted with a dummy for age greater
than or equal to 65 and a dummy for year in or after 2006. Points represent means for people in
each age cell (measured in quarters).
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Table 2.3: Robustness Check, Different Bandwidths and Specifications, NAMCS
Age 63-66 Age 62-67 Age 61-68 Age 59-70 Age 58-71
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Rx Drugs
Panel A: without controls 0.4998* 0.5079* 0.6942* 0.6831** 0.8397** 0.5938*
[0.269] [0.293] [0.390] [0.325] [0.358] [0.317]
R-squared 0.045 0.041 0.042 0.042 0.041 0.042
Panel B: with controls 0.4597* 0.5124** 0.5834* 0.6636** 0.7835** 0.5872**
[0.235] [0.257] [0.336] [0.284] [0.309] [0.277]
R-squared 0.216 0.210 0.211 0.207 0.201 0.198
Number of Generic Drugs
Panel A: without controls 0.2513** 0.2520* 0.3397* 0.3501** 0.3272** 0.2613*
[0.125] [0.133] [0.182] [0.150] [0.159] [0.136]
R-squared 0.053 0.052 0.053 0.055 0.055 0.058
Panel B: with controls 0.2405** 0.2538** 0.2948* 0.3453** 0.3130** 0.2658**
[0.112] [0.125] [0.174] [0.140] [0.148] [0.129]
R-squared 0.165 0.163 0.164 0.164 0.158 0.158
Order of Polynomial 1 2 3 3 4 4
Observation 10,538 15,772 15,772 21,072 31,898 37,400
1 Control variables for regressions include dummy of year 2006, age 65 or over, polynomial control of
age in days and their full interaction with age 65 dummy and year2006 dummy, patient sex, race,
Charlson index dummies, disease category by primary diagnosis codes, visit quarter, physician
specialty type, whether it is a solo practice or not, electronic medical records utilization, MSA
status and dummy for revenue from Medicare patients above median.
2 ***Significant at the 1% level (two-tail test); ** Significant at the 5% level (two-tail test); *
Significant at the 10% level (two-tail test).
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Chapter 3
Pay-For-Performance (P4P) Program
Analysis of P4P Program for Utilization of
Preventive Care Services among Medicaid
Population in United States
3.1 Introduction
Medicaid finances health care for more than one out of every five Americans; primarily eligible
are low-income individuals and families. In the 1990’s, Medicaid expenditures grew rapidly, at
an average annual rate of 22.4% between 1988 and 1992 and 9.5% between 1992 and 1995. Be-
ginning in the late 1990’s and through the 2000’s, in response to rising health care costs, many
state Medicaid agencies subcontracted with managed care organizations to administrate their
Medicaid program. Among states with Medicaid managed care programs, some further adopted
pay-for-performance (P4P) programs in order to link their health care spending to quality and
efficiency of care. Over the past ten years, twenty states adopted Medicaid managed care P4P
programs and new programs and approaches are continuously being added. However, limited
literature exists that studies the effect of such P4P programs. This paper examines the effect of
pay-for-performance (P4P) programs on the utilization of cancer screening procedures for adults
and vaccine rate for children among Medicaid populations in United States. We also address effec-
tiveness of different incentive design of those state P4P program in terms of improving utilization
of those preventive care services
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In many states, the main reason to adopt P4P programs is because of the concerns about
the consequences of implementations of Medicaid managed care plans. Medicaid managed care
plans provide beneficiaries with enhanced coverage of preventive care services in order to improve
their access to care; however, they use a capitation payment scheme, which seeks to reduce costs,
rather than fee-for-service (FFS). Their effect on the quality of health care is uncertain since
they can reduce unnecessary or necessary services. The number of enrollees in managed care
plans continued to grow a lot in the 90’s. And by 2000, over 50% of Medicaid beneficiaries in
the States were insured through managed care organizations (MCOs). As a result, there were
concerns among advocates for low-income and disadvantaged groups.
On the other hand, preventive care plays an important role in the health care delivery system,
especially for the low-income population. For example, Hillman et al. (1999) pointed out that
“childhood immunization is a cost-effective means of preventing diseases also reflects the adequacy
of pediatric health care in general”. Alexander and Korenbrot (1995) regards prenatal care as
a means to identify mothers at risk of “delivering a preterm or growth-retarded infant” and to
provide available medical interventions intended to reduce the risks of low birth weight and other
adverse pregnancy outcomes. Despite the benefits of preventive care, the low-income population,
Medicaid’s primary target group, tends to have a lower utilization rate for preventive care services
and poorer health status.
For those reasons, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) started to promote
quality and value-based purchasing through its Medicaid/SCHIP Quality Initiative. By CMS’s
definition, P4P is a “quality improvement and reimbursement methodology which is aimed at
moving towards payments that create much stronger financial support for patient focused, high
value care . . . attempts to promote reimbursement for quality, access efficiency, and successful
outcomes.” (CMS, 2006). As a joint program between federal and state governments, states also
adopted P4P programs for their Medicaid managed care plans by either rewarding plans with
high performance or ’punishing’ plans with low performance. And most states use utilization of
preventive care services, such as blood lead screen rates, child immunization rates, and timeliness
of prenatal care as performance measures. Kuhmerker and Hartman (2007) find that over 70
percent of existing Medicaid P4P programs operate under managed care environments. According
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to their follow-up interviews with state Medicaid agencies, this number is still rising.
Past literature finds that the implementation of state P4P programs is especially effective
in improving the utilization of preventive care. McMenamin et al. (2003) and Roski et al.
(2003) both found a positive effect of financial incentives on a smoking cessation intervention.
Rosenthal et al. (2005) performed a difference-in-difference analysis using generalized estimating
equations and found improvements in cervical cancer screening, mammography, and hemoglobin
A1C testing. However, little research exists devoted to the nationwide investigation of whether
or not P4P programs affect the utilization of preventive care among the low-income population.
Kuhmerker and Hartman (2007) summarize existing and new P4P activities in state Medicaid
programs, but their study does not examine the effect of P4P programs on any health outcomes.
The purposes of our study is to assess whether or not the P4P program affects the utilization of
preventive care for beneficiaries enrolled in a Medicaid managed care organization. We also want
to examine if the magnitude of the effect differs depending on different types of “incentives” and
“measures”. Our study utilizes data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), which
is a national longitudinal survey data set that allows us to observe changes in utilization of adult
preventive care services before and after the adoption of P4P programs in every state. Specifically,
we will study the effect on the utilization of the following preventive care services: mammograms
among women 40-64; colonoscopy for men or women aged 50-64; cholesterol testing; blood pressure
checks; and prostate (PSA) testing. We also analyze National Immunization Survey (NIS) data,
with which we further examine the impact on preventive care, specifically childhood immunization
rate. Our hypotheses states that adoption of Medicaid managed care P4P programs will increase
utilization of preventive care services for both adults and children, and different incentive design
of P4P program impact outcomes differently.
Specifically, we will utilize difference-in-difference (DD) estimation strategy that compares
changes in utilization among Medicaid beneficiaries in states adopting P4P programs, relative
to those in states that fail to adopt, before and after the implementation. We expect to see
a greater increase in utilization in states with P4P programs relative to others without P4P
programs. We don’t have information on the enrollment into managed care plans in the dataset.
So in order to establish the association between the P4P program and outcomes among Medicaid
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managed care population, we utilize difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) specification and
further compares the outcome changes for states with above median and below median Medicaid
managed care penetration rate. To examine the relative effectiveness of different incentive designs,
we estimate the DDD specification by separating time trends for states with different incentive
designs.
The rest of this paper is outlined as follows. In the second section, we introduce background
and details of the P4P program and provide an in-depth review of relevant literature. In the third
section, we describe the data source as well as independent and dependent variables used in the
analysis. Next, we address our estimation equation and econometric method. In the following
section, we present our preliminary results and perform additional estimations in order to check
the robustness of basic results,. In the last section, we conclude our results and discuss future
research questions.
3.2 Literature Review
Petersen et al. (2006) performed a systematic review of several studies assessing the effect of
explicit financial incentives for improved performance on measures of health care quality. He/She
found few empirical studies available and most focused on the utilization of preventive care among
those available studies. Hillman et al. (1998) and Hillman et al. (1999) utilize randomized con-
trolled trials to assign a single lump sum bonus to Medicaid HMOs and found no difference
between treatment and control groups on physician compliance with cancer screening guidelines
and with pediatric preventive care, respectively. However, Kouides et al. (1998) also conducted
a randomized controlled trial on 54 solo or group practices that participated in the 1990 Medi-
care Demonstration Project in Rochester and surrounding Monroe County in New York. They
rewarded providers in the treatment group with $0.80-$1.60 per shot during the 1991 influenza
immunization season and found a significant improvement in the immunization rate for the treat-
ment group as compared to the control group.
Other studies use survey data to analyze the effect of financial incentives. McMenamin et al.
(2003) utilize nationwide survey data documenting the extent to which physician organizations
provide support for smoking cessation interventions. They found factors of support for smoking
CHAPTER 3. PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE (P4P) PROGRAM 85
cessation are positively associated with financial incentives to promote smoking cessation inter-
vention, requirements to report HEDIS data, the percentage of primary care physicians, and HMO
ownership of the organization. Rosenthal et al. (2005) exploited a natural experiment related to
pay-for-performance using administrative reports of physician group quality from an intervention
group (California physician groups) and a comparison group (Pacific Northwest physician groups)
from October 2001 through April 2004. They performed a difference-in-difference analysis exam-
ining cervical cancer screening, mammography, and hemoglobin A1c testing, and they find that
compared to the control group, the treatment group demonstrated greater quality improvement
for cervical cancer screening after the pay-for-performance intervention.
According to past literature, the design of P4P programs also makes a difference on outcomes.
Felt-Lisk et al. (2007) found that “money talks” only works if certain supportive elements are pre-
sented in the programs. They examine five Medicaid-focused plans that offer financial incentives
for improving baby care and identify key features of plans with better performance, i.e. better
birth outcomes. Those key features are strong communication with providers, placing enough
dollars at stake to compensate providers for their effort. Casalino et al. (2007) also pointed out
that P4P programs, if not carefully designed, may have the unintended consequence of increasing
racial and ethnic disparities. For instance, P4P and public reporting may adversely affect the
income of physicians practicing in minority communities, therefore limiting the number of physi-
cians practicing in those areas and the physician’s ability to invest in processes to improve quality.
Alternatively, P4P and public reporting may induce individual physicians or medical groups to
avoid treating patients with poorer health status, who may lower their quality score if the quality
measure does not adjust for patients’ overall health status. Furthermore, the public report might
benefit educated patients more than uneducated patients. Thus, Felt-Lisk suggests that P4P pro-
grams should use risk adjustments and stratified analysis and reward both the absolute quality
score as well as improvements over time.
Our study makes several contributions to existing literature. Few studies investigate the effect
of P4P programs at the national level. Kuhmerker and Hartman (2007) summarize existing and
new P4P activities in state Medicaid programs. However, they do not examine the effect of P4P
programs on any health outcomes. Other studies, which assess health outcomes, focus on a small
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scale by using data from randomized controlled trials (Hillman et al., 1998; Hillman et al., 1999) or
using state-level data (Shen, 2003). We will use national data to study the effect of P4P programs.
Since most of the literature has focused on pay for performance to health care providers, such as
hospitals and physicians, we analyze the effect of P4P on managed care plans.
Secondly, we take advantage of variation due to the staggered adoption of P4P in each state.
By limiting the study sample to the Medicaid population, and by exploiting differential changes
in the utilization of preventive care and health outcomes of states with P4P policies relative to
those without P4P policies, we minimize the extent to which unobserved time-invariant state
characteristics might contaminate estimates.
Additionally, we investigate the differential effect of various incentive types and measures. As
discussed earlier, states can adopt different incentive types, such as bonuses, penalties, and differ-
ential reimbursement rates. They can also measure “performance” by attainment, improvement,
or a hybrid of these two. In order to provide more policy relevance, our regression analysis allows
us to obtain estimates of the relative strengths of each policy component.
3.3 Background
The Medicaid P4P program is a state-specific, plan-based, and performance-tracking system with
assessment and feedback. Participating managed care plans receive incentives, or in some instances
are “punished”, based on specific performance criteria measured within a certain time horizon.
Generally, P4P programs have several components, each consisting of several options that states
select in order to best address their particular improvement goals.
States first choose outcomes as measurements for plans’ performance. Different states select
different performance measures that are best suited to address their particular improvement goals.
The most popular measures used by P4P programs are the Health Plan Employer Data and In-
formation Set (HEDIS) and HEDIS-like measures. HEDIS is a set of standardized performance
measures for managed care organizations, and the measures are mainly related to preventive and
primary care for chronic diseases. Examples of HEDIS measures include childhood immunization
rates, timeliness of prenatal care, comprehensive diabetes care measures, use of appropriate med-
ications for people with asthma, various types of cancer screening, and assistance with smoking
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cessation. HEDIS-like measures are similar to HEDIS measures and are related to other preven-
tive care performance. Some states target different aspects of Medicaid programs, so they use
other measures, such as structural measures, cost/efficiency measures, measures based on patient
experiences, and measures based on medical records. 1
Then in order to determine whether or not the plan qualifies for an “incentive”, states choose
among different methods to evaluate performance of each plan. Methods include attainment,
improvement, or a hybrid of these two methods, and in rare situations, peer comparison. 2
There are both advantages and disadvantages to attainment and improvement methods. While
easier to implement, the attainment method discourages lower-level performers that have little
chance to attain the target level. Such performers may opt-out from the program if participation
is not mandatory. Also, plans that have already achieved the adequate level of performance
have little incentive for further improvement. As for the improvement method, a poor performer
might improve his performance from low-level to medium-level, but a good performer has limited
potential to improve since he is already performing at a high-level and incurs a higher marginal
cost to further improve. Thus, a hybrid method of attainment and improvement provides a better
balance of the advantages and disadvantages of both methods. However, different states adopt
different method best suited their own situation. For example, to ensure a basic level of attainment
is reached, Nevada established a bottom level of performance, beneath which no incentive payment
is provided. Massachusetts is considering using incentives to reward attainment of specified levels
of performance as well as improvement.
Lastly, states choose different incentive designs to reward plans with high performance, or pun-
ish plans with low performance. Incentive designs include one or more of these types: differential
reimbursement rates, bonuses, grants to penalties, withholds and public reporting. Differential
reimbursement is a change in the ongoing reimbursement rate or fee to reflect achievement of or
1Structural measures, the second most common type of performance measure, relate to a specific status or
activity, such as accreditation status, health information technology adoption, being open on weekends, or the time
it takes to get an appointment. They are not direct measures of quality and outcomes, but they assess patients’
access to care and if the plan provides quality care. Cost/efficiency measures evaluate overall savings in the present
period as compared to a prior period, for a given subpopulation of Medicaid beneficiaries.
2Attainment is an established level of performance, which is used to evaluate the actual performance of each
plan and decide if the plan qualifies for an incentive. Improvement is another assessment method that rewards
improvement over a previous baseline or performance level. States that use a hybrid method of attainment and
improvement could set up both a specific level of performance and gradations of improvement, and a plan has to
meet both criteria to get the rewards.
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improvement in the required performance levels. Auto-assignment rewards high-quality providers
by assigning beneficiaries who fail to choose a managed care plan or provider to them. Penalties
are one-time requirements for plans or providers to repay the state (or to have the state recoup
previously paid funds) to reflect the failure to meet required performance levels. Withholds are
performance-related funding that Medicaid programs set aside and do not return to providers un-
til providers demonstrate that a particular standard has been met. We categorize these inventive
designs into three types: positive incentive type which includes differential reimbursement rate,
negative incentive type which includes penalties and withholds as well as non-financial incentive
type which includes both auto-assignment and public reporting.
Table 3.1 summarizes all P4P programs for Medicaid managed care plans in the United States.3
We list the adoption year, incentive type, whether the state targets the improvement of preventive
care, and whether there has been an evaluation for the program. From the table, we can see that
nineteen out of fifty states adopted P4P programs for Medicaid managed care plans up until
2009. Nine of those P4P programs focus on improving utilization of preventive care; eight has
been done some form of evaluations. For the incentive types, each state adopted one to three
types. Sixteen states adopted differential reimbursement rate, six adopted auto-assignment, while
five have withholds some funding as an incentive type. There are also a lot of variations in the time
of adoption that we can exploit in order to estimate the impact of P4P programs on outcomes.
3.4 Data
We compile our samples from three different sources. We use National Health Interview Survey
(NHIS) data to estimate the impact of Medicaid managed care P4P programs on the utilization of
cancer screening procedures and other preventive care services for adults. The NHIS, conducted
annually by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), is a cross-sectional, household inter-
view survey that includes a nationally representative sample of the civilian, non-institutionalized
population in the United States.
The dependent variables we examine are extracted from HEDIS measures. We use are mam-
3 2009 National Summary of State Medicaid Managed Care Programs: Program Description as
of June 30, 2009.Available online https://www.cms.gov/MedicaidDataSourcesGenInfo/downloads/
2009NationalSummaryReport.pdf (CMS, 2009)
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mogram exam among women 50-64, colonoscopy for men or women aged 50-64, cholesterol exam
for men or women aged 50-64, cholesterol check exam for respondents aged 40-64, blood pressure
check for respondents aged 40-64, Pap smear test for women aged 40-64 and adult hepatitis B
vaccine for respondents aged 18-64. All those outcomes will be dummies, 1/0 indicates the person
has done it or not in the survey year. NHIS only has related survey questions in certain years
and we summarized survey years for each outcome in Table 3.2. Therefore, our analysis will use
different analysis samples for different outcomes. 4 Fortunately, most states adopted P4P policies
around our sample period. According to the summary of the state adoption dates in Table 3.1,
we can exploit time variation in order to estimate the effect of P4P programs. The NHIS data
also includes information on patients’ demographic characteristics as gender, age, race, Ethnicity,
education level, health status and any limitation on activity level. We control for these variables
as baseline covariates in our specification.
We then analyze National Immunization Survey (NIS) (1999-2010) to study the impact of
Medicaid managed care P4P program on the childhood immunization rate. The NIS is conducted
jointly by NCIRD and the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention. It is a list-assisted random-digit-dialing telephone survey followed by a
mailed survey to childrens immunization providers that began data collection in April 1994 to
monitor immunization coverage for children aged 19 to 35 months.
We study the impact of P4P program on all performance measures from HEDIS in the paper,
including up-to-date 4 doses of diphtheria-tetanus toxoids-pertussis vaccine (DTP), up-to-date 3
doses of poliovirus vaccine (Polio), up-to-date 1 does of measles-mumps-rubella vaccine (MMR),
up-to-date 3 does of Haemophilus influenzae type B vaccine (Hib), up-to-date 3 does of hepatitis B
vaccine (Hep B), up-to-date 1 doe of Varicella at 12+ months (Varicella), up-to-date 4:3:1 vaccine
series (DTP, Polio, MMR), up-to-date 4:3:1:3:3 vaccine series (DTP, Polio, MMR, Hib and Hep
B) and the most complete vaccine series, up-to-date 4:3:1:3:3:1 vaccine series (DTP, Polio, MMR,
Hib, Hep B and Varicella).
There is no specific indicator for insurance coverage in NIS data. So we utilize a variable
called family income as percentage of federal poverty line, and refer to the Medicaid eligibility
4Please check Table 3.3 for sample sizes of each analysis.
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criteria for each state in each year, in order to determine Medicaid eligibility status. And we
only select observations with verified information either from a shot card or from a provider into
our final sample. The final sample size varies from outcome to outcome.5 We control for child
characteristics such as age, birth parity, race, Ethnicity and sex, as well as mother characteristics
such as number of children in the household, education level, mobility and age in our specification.
Our final data source is Medicaid managed care penetration rate for each state and each year
from CMS. We merge this rate into NHIS and NIS datasets in order to identify whether the
respondent lives in a state with above or below median Medicaid managed care penetration level.
3.5 Research Design and Methods
We now discuss the empirical strategy we use to address our research questions. In this section,
we will present the estimation strategy for estimating the impact of Medicaid managed care on
utilization of preventive care services, as well as the relative effectiveness of different incentive
designs of various states P4P program.
3.5.1 Main Specifications
We use difference-in-difference (DD) approach to address our first research question. A DD
approach normally defines Medicaid beneficiaries living in a state that adopted a P4P program as
the treatment group, and those Medicaid beneficiaries living in a state that does not adopt a P4P
program as the control group. The idea is to compare the outcome changes for the treatment group
before and after the treatment, i.e., the introduction of P4P programs, with outcome changes for
those of the control group. In the context of this paper, we would estimate the effect of policy
by exploiting the relative changes in utilization of various preventive care services by Medicaid
beneficiaries who live in a state with P4P program before and after the adoption of the program,
compared to those Medicaid beneficiaries who live in a state without P4P program.
Using outcomes of patient i in state j in year t as dependent variable, we estimate the following
5Please check Table 3.4 for sample sizes of each analysis.
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equation:
Outcomeijt = β0 + β1P4Pj + β2Y eart + β3P4Pj ∗Postt + β4Xi + β5Yj + β6Statej + ijt, (3.1)
where Outcomeijt is one of sixteen measures for patient i in state j in year t. We use P4Pj
to indicate a respondent who lives in a state with P4P program for its Medicaid managed care
program, and Postt to indicate the time period after the adoption of P4P program for that state.
We control for X which is a vector of personal characteristics, Y eart which is a vector of year
dummies and Statej which is a vector of state dummies.
6 State dummies control for any time-
invariant trends in outcomes in different states, and year dummies control for any idiosyncratic
shocks to outcomes in all the states. P4Pj ∗ Postt is the variable of interest. The coefficient
β3 measures the effect of the P4P program on the outcome variables by comparing the outcome
changes of treatment group with those of control group. In order to account for the design of
survey data, all coefficients and standard errors are weighted statistics using survey instruments.
The second empirical approach we use to analyze the impact of P4P program is difference-in-
differece-in-difference (DDD) specification.
Since Medicaid managed care P4P programs are meant for beneficiaries covered by managed
care plans, it would be a nature practice to estimate the outcome changes for those covered by
Medicaid managed care plans with outcomes changes for those covered by Medicaid non-managed
care plans. However, there are certain disadvantage associated with this method. First, Medicaid
beneficiaries who enrolled into managed care plans are different from those who enrolled into
non-managed care plans, for example, sicker beneficiaries may be more likely to choose FFS over
managed care if they have a choice. Also, beneficiaries who enrolled into managed care plans
and those who enrolled into FFS plans are likely to live in different geographic locations; and
those different residence locations might have different economic and other conditions that may
be correlated with the health status of their Medicaid beneficiaries. These may all lead to biased
estimates for the effect of P4P program.
6Personal characteristics include gender, age, race, Ethnicity, education level, health status and any limitation
on activity level for the analysis of NHIS data; and child characteristics such as age, birth parity, race, Ethnicity
and sex, as well as mother characteristics such as number of children in the household, education level, mobility
and age for the analysis of NIS data.
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In order to analyze the impact of P4P program for Medicaid managed care plan, we add the
third tier of difference by introducing the indicator of being in a state with above median Medicaid
managed care penetration rate. This allows us to estimate the impact of P4P policy for those
who are more likely to be covered by Medicaid managed care plans without introducing the self
selection bias we discussed earlier. 7 Specifically, we estimate the following DDD specification
using the sample of Medicaid beneficiaries:
Outcomeijt = β0 + β1P4Pj + β2Y eart + β3Abovejt + β4P4Pj × Postt ×Abovejt
+ β5P4Pj × Y eart + β6P4Pj ×Abovejt + β7Y eart ×Abovejt + β8Xi + β9Statej + ijt, (3.2)
where Abovejt is an indicator for states with above median Medicaid managed care penetration
rate.
The key variable is P4Pj ×Postt×Abovejt because it identifies outcomes of Medicaid benefi-
ciaries in states with a P4P program and above median Medicaid managed care penetration rate
after P4P has been implemented. Its coefficient, β4, is thus an estimate of the change in outcomes
for Medicaid beneficiaries in P4P state with high penetration rate after the adoption of P4P pro-
gram, compared to their previous outcome before adoption, relative to changes in outcomes over
time for P4P states with below median penetration rate, relative to the same outcome difference
over time for non-P4P states.
3.5.2 Alternative Estimation
In order to examine the differential effect of various incentive types, we allow the time trend to
vary with different policy components. Coefficients for these interactions will indicate which types
of incentives has a greater effect on the outcomes of interest.
Outcomeijt = β0 + β1P4Pj + β2Y eart + β3P4Pj × Postt ×Aj + β4P4Pj × Postt ×Bj
+ β5P4Pj × Postt × Cj + β6Xi + β7Statej + ijt, (3.3)
7We examined the variation of state-level Medicaid managed care penetration rate in Appendix TableC.8 and
found some variation of this indicator in most states along years
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where Aj , Bj and Cj denote dummies for using positive financial incentives, negative financial
incentives and non-financial incentives respectively. The coefficients β3, β4 and β5 are estimates
for impact of P4P programs on outcomes with different incentive designs.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Results for Main Specification
Table 3.3 presents descriptive statistics for the outcomes used in the estimations, for the entire
sample and for the states with adoption of P4P program, before and after policy adoption, as
well as for the states without adoption of P4P program.
The DD and DDD estimation results for analysis of NHIS data are shown on Table 3.4:
Panel A shows the DD results, Panel B shows DDD results. All estimations include the personal
characteristics described in data section as well as year, and state fixed effects. Sample weights
were used and standard errors accounted for the complex design of the surveys.
The results in Panel A suggest that among those on Medicaid, state adoption of a P4P pro-
gram is positively associated with the likelihood that adults have received several preventive care
services, including mammograms, blood pressure checks and Pap smears. Specifically, P4P adop-
tion is associated with a 5.2 percentage point (about 6 percent) increase in the probability that
women aged 50-64 has received a mammogram in the past year and about a 5.6 percentage point
(13.2 percent) increase in the probability that individuals aged 50-64 have had their cholesterol
checked in the past five years. Panel B shows that these beneficial effects are larger in states with
higher Medicaid managed care penetration rates. There is a 16 percentage point (36.6 percent)
increase in the probability that individuals aged 50-64 have had their cholesterol checked, 11.2
percentage point (24.5 percent) increase in the probability that individuals aged 50-64 have had
their blood pressure taken and 9 percentage point (25.9 percent) increase in the probability that
women aged 40-64 has done a Pap smear exam.
The DD and DDD estimation results for analysis of NIS data are shown on Table 3.5: Panel
A shows the DD results, Panel B shows DDD results. Again we control for children and mother
characteristics mentioned in the data section, and we account for the survey design by using all
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survey instruments in the regression. Results in Panel A confirms our hypotheses that adoption of
state P4P program is associated with higher utilization of childhood immunization, an important
form of preventive care services among children. Specifically, P4P adoption is associated with
about a 1.1, 1.6, and 2.3 percentage point (1, 2, and 3 percent, respectively) increase in the
probability that children on Medicaid are up-to-date on the 3 doses of Haemophilus influenza
type B vaccine, the 4:3:1, and the 4:3:1:3:3 vaccine series, respectively. Panel B suggests that
the beneficial effect is still significant if we compare the differential impact for high Medicaid
managed care penetration state with low Medicaid managed care penetration state. There is
a 2.95 percentage point (about 3.5 percent) increase in the probability of up-to-date 1 dose of
Varicella and 3.58 percentage point (about 5.17 percent) increase in probability of the most
complete vaccine series, 4:3:1:3:3:1 associated with the beneficiaries that lives in a state with P4P
program and higher penetration rate after policy adoption.
3.6.2 Effectiveness of Different Incentive Designs
The DDD estimation results for analysis of relative effectiveness of different incentive design for
P4P program with NHIS data, and NIS data respectively are shown on Table 3.6 and Table 3.7.
Consistent significance for the coefficient of the interaction term among above median penetration
rate, P4P post adoption dummy and dummy for using negative financial incentive type suggest
that states that use negative financial incentives, such as withholds and penalties, rather than
states with positive financial incentives and non-financial incentives are more effective in improving
utilization of adult cancer screen procedure as well as other preventive care services, and children
immunization rate.
3.7 Conclusion
The overall results in this paper suggest that Medicaid managed care P4P programs are associated
with increases in the use of preventive care services. We also find that P4P states with higher
Medicaid managed care penetration rate or with negative financial incentive type in their program
design are most effective in achieving this goal.
With expansions in Medicaid eligibility possible, Medicaid managed care programs may cover
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more individuals. Our conclusion confirms that states attempt to link health care spending to
quality and efficiency of care with P4P programs are effective. Results provide evidence that P4P
programs are associated with increases in the use of preventive care services among Medicaid
enrollees, especially for states with higher Medicaid managed care penetration rates. The incen-
tive design of the program also matters since there are significant associations between different
incentive types and the magnitude of increases in preventive care use.
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Table 3.1: Summary of States Medicaid Managed Care P4P Programs
State Date Incentive1 Incentive2 Incentive3 Preventive care Evaluation
California 2005 auto-assignment no no
Colorado 2007 differentials no no
Illinois 2006 payments no no
Indiana 2008 differentials public reporting withholds yes no
Maryland 2002 differentials public reporting yes yes
Massachusetts 2010 differentials withholds no no
Michigan 2001 differentials auto-assignment yes yes
Minnesota 2006 differentials yes no
Minnesota 1999 differentials no no
Missouri 2001 differentials auto-assignment no yes
Nevada 2006 differentials yes yes
New Mexico 1997 differentials auto-assignment withholds yes no
New York 2000 differentials auto-assignment public reporting no yes
Ohio 2002 differentials auto-assignment penalties yes yes
Oregon 2008 differentials no no
Pennsylvania 2006 differentials no yes
Rhode Island 1999 differentials yes yes
Tennessee 2006 differentials withholds no no
Washington 2004 withholds no no
Wisconsin 1996 differentials yes no
1 2009 National Summary of State Medicaid Managed Care Programs: Program Description as of June 30,
2009.Available online
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Table 3.2: Dependent Variables and Analysis Sample
Data sources Dependent variable Survey year
NHIS Ever had a mammogram for female respondents between 50 and 64 98,99,00, 03, 05, 08, 10
Ever had a colonoscopy for respondents between 50 and 64 00, 03, 05, 08
Ever had any colorectal exam for respondents between 50 and 64 00, 03, 05, 08
Ever had cholesterol checked for respondent between 40 and 64 98, 03, 08
Ever had the blood pressure taken for respondent between 40 and 64 98,99, 03,08
Ever had a Pap smear test for female respondent between 40 and 64 98,99,00, 03, 05, 08, 10
Ever received hepatitis B vaccine for respondent between 18 and 64 00, 03, 05, 08, 10
1 Survey years are summarized by authors from NHIS documents from 1998-2010.
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Appendix A
Description of the Data-Merging
Procedure Between NAMCS and
FDA Orangebook Database
The most updated FDA drug approval database is located at http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
InformationOnDrugs/ucm129689.htm.
Three zipped ASCII files are downloaded from the website. The one under the name prod-
ucts.txt is the one containing information about ingredient, dosage form, trader name, approval
date and type (whether it is a prescription drug or not). Next, we transferred the data into
STATA format using StatTransfer. We cleaned the data to calculate the approval date for each
drug, counting drugs with different manufacturers or strengths or packages as the same drug.
The NAMCS data has variables called MED1-MED8 (up to MED6 if before 2003). These
variables using a different drug coding system beginning in 2006, but with the SAS program
DRUGCHAR MULTUM ‘year′.sas provided by NCHS, one can change the variables in NAMCS
2002-2005 and make them consistent with those in or after 2006. We then identify the drug trade
name using appendix B (drug entry codes and names in numeric order) from the FDA site. We
copied and pasted the list into STATA (drug name code2002.dta−drug name code2009.dta) and
merged this list with NAMCS data.
Now that we have drug trade names in both the FDA and NAMCS datasets, we can go ahead
and merge the FDA approval date onto NAMCS data using the first word of the drug name (most
of the drugs can be identified with the first word in its name). And the merge rate was around
95% with this method for prescription drugs.
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Appendix B
Theoretical Framework for Chapter 2
B.1 Set Up of the Model
In this appendix, we present the theoretical model supporting hypotheses of this paper.
We have several basic assumptions to set up this model. The first is that physicians are
altruistic in their treatment decisions. Physicians decide the best amount of prescription drugs
for the patient.
This physician altruistic assumption is commonly imposed by a lot of literatures. Arrow
(1963) suggested that health care providers, unlike providers in other business, may care about
their clients’ welfare, and behave in an altruistic way. As it comes to Medicare patients, physicians
do not pay for the drugs they prescribe to patients financially (it might take effort and time for
physicians to get to know patients’ insurance plan policies and coverage, which is a non-financial
cost), nor do they get reimbursed for their prescription behavior. Also, we assume physicians are
price takes for health care services provided to Medicare patients.
Thus, we can write utility function for an individual patient as:
max
Di,Ai,Ti
wf (i) = mF (Di, Ai, Ti)− kdpdDi − ktptTi (B.1)
Di represents the number of drug treatment for patient i, Ai, is the effort level physicians
take to treat the patient, and Ti is the quantity of other medical care services performed in the
physician office for patient i, such as blood pressure check, X-ray, EKG/ECG, Pap test, urinalysis,
PSA test, and CBC (complete blood count). F is a health production function of prescription
drug, other medical care services and physician effort inputs. We assume F is increasing in all
three inputs and twice continuously differentiable for positive levels of inputs. Health adds positive
utility to patients’ utility function and each unit of health worths $m. pd and pt stands for the
listed price of each unit of drug and other medical care services, respectively. Although different
in the generosity of coverage, with Medicare or private insurance, patients only need to pay a
fraction of listed prices, the fraction for prescription drugs is kd, for other services is kt.
The partial derivatives are FD, FT and the second derivatives are FDD, FTT and FDT .
We will also assume F (Di, Ti) is homothetic or homogeneous in Di and Ti. And the health
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production function satisfies the Inada conditions. That is
lim
Di→0
FD(Di, Ti) = lim
Ti→0
FT (Di, Ti) = 0 (B.2)
and
lim
Di→∞
FT (Di, Ti) = lim
Ti→∞
FT (Di, Ti) = 0 (B.3)
B.1.1 The Impact of Part D on the Prescribing Pattern
The adoption of Part D policy will lower the OOP cost of prescription drug to Medicare patients,
as we dicussed in the background section. Specifically, it will reflect in the decrease of kd. We
can thus analyze the effect of the adoption of Part D policy as comparative statics of kd. If we
don’t consider the utilization of other services, we can further separate prescribed drugs into two
category: generic and branded drugs. Assume physician prescribe Dgi unit of generic drugs and
Dbi unit of branded drugs for the patients. OOP cost fraction of price patients need to pay for
generic drugs is kdg , for branded drugs is kdb .
Then we can write the objective function as:
max
Dgi,Dbi
wf (i) = mF (Dgi, Dbi)− kdgpgDgi − kdbpbDbi (B.4)
PROPOSITION 1: assume F (Dgi, Dbi) be homothetic in Dgi and Dbi, then the move from
less generous prescription drug coverage to more generous drug coverage may affect the generic-
branded drug ratio. Using D
′
gi and D
′
bi to indicate the number of prescribed generic and branded
drugs after the adoption of Part D, we have
D
′
gi
D
′
bi
>=<
Dgi
Dbi
if and only if
k
′
dg
k
′
db
<=>
kdg
kdb
(B.5)
Proof: The first order conditions of this maximization problem are:
mFDgi(Dgi, Dbi)− kdgpg = 0 (B.6)
and
mFDbi(Dgi, Dbi)− kdbpb = 0 (B.7)
for generic and branded prescription drugs.
Taking the ratio of (6) to (7) we have:
FDgi(Dgi, Dbi)
FDbi(Dgi, Dbi
=
kdgpg
kdbpb
(B.8)
Applying the same procedure to derive the equation for the prescription drugs after the adop-
tion of Part D, we have:
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F
D
′
gi
(D
′
gi, D
′
bi)
F
D
′
bi
(D
′
gi, D
′
bi)
=
kd′g
pg
k
d
′
b
pb
(B.9)
Further taking the ratio of (9) to (8), we obtain
F
D
′
gi
(D
′
gi, D
′
bi)/FD′bi
(D
′
gi, D
′
bi)
FDgi(Dgi, Dbi)/FDbi(Dgi, Dbi
=
k
′
dg
/k
′
db
kdg/kdb
(B.10)
When F (Dgi, Dbi) is homothetic in Dgi and Dbi, the left side of equation (10) is a decreasing
function of
D
′
gi/D
′
bi
Dgi/Dbi
. Then we can establish the relationship in equation (5).
Proposition 1 implies that when the relative generosity of insurance coverage for generic and
branded drugs changes, the ratio of generic drugs and branded name drugs in physicians’ prescrip-
tion will change as well. Specifically, when Part D increase the generosity for generic drugs more
than they do for branded drugs, i.e.: the OOP cost fraction for generic drugs decrease more than
that for branded drugs (
k
′
dg
k
′
db
<
kdg
kdb
), results will show that the utilization for generic drugs increase
more than the increase of branded drugs (
D
′
gi
D
′
bi
>
Dgi
Dbi
).Otherwise, empirical results will show that
the utilization for generic drugs increase less than the increase of branded drugs (
D
′
gi
D
′
bi
<
Dgi
Dbi
).
B.2 The Impact of Part D on the Utilization of Prescription
Drugs and Other Medical Care Services
The adoption of Part D policy will lower the OOP cost of prescription drug to Medicare patients.
Specifically, it will reflect in the decrease of out-of-pocket cost fraction of prescription drug kd.
We can thus analyze the effect of the adoption of Part D policy as comparative statics of kd.
Then we can write the objective function as:
max
Di,Ai,Ti
wf (i) = mF (Di, Ai, Ti)− kdpdDi − ktptTi (B.11)
PROPOSITION 2: Let Di(kd) and Ti(kd) be the optimal choices for patient i at the copay
kd. Then
dDi(kd)
dkd
=
pdFDD
FDDFTT − (FDT )2 < 0 (B.12)
PROPOSITION 3: assume F (Di, Ai, Ti) be homogeneous of degree α < 1 in Di and Ti,we
can get F (Di, Ai, Ti) = G1(Ai)φ(Di, Ti)
α, in which φ(·, ·) exhibits constant return to scale. Let
the local elasticity of substitution between drug and non-drug treatment be DT . Thus we have
dTi(kd)
dkd
>=< 0if and only if
1
1− α <=> DT (B.13)
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Proof: The first order conditions of this maximization problem are:
mFD(Di, Ai, Ti)− kdpd = 0 (B.14)
and
mFT (Di, Ai, Ti)− ktpt = 0 (B.15)
for prescription drug and other medical care services.
The first order conditions are necessary and sufficient for the maximization of patients’ utility
function. Taking the total differential of the two first order condition with respect to Di, Ti and
kd, we have: FDD FDT
FTD FTT

dD
dT
 =
pd
0
 dkd (B.16)
Apply Cramer’s rule, we can get dDi(kd)dkd =
pdFDD
FDDFTT−(FDT )2 . The second order condition for
maximization of patient utility function ensures that FDDFTT − (FDT )2 > 0 while the concavity
of F function ensures that FDD < 0. Thus
dDi(kd)
dkd
< 0.
We also get dTi(kd)dkd =
−pdFDT
FDDFTT−(FDT )2 after applying Cramer’s rule. Thus
dTi(kd)
dkd
will be positive
if FDT < 0, and it will negative it FDT > 0.
Assuming F (Di, Ai, Ti) be homogenous of degree α < 1 in Di and Ti (that is, F (Di, Ai, Ti) =
G(Ai)φ(Di, Ti)
α), we have
FDT = αG(Ai)φ(Di, Ti)
α−2((α− 1)φDφT + φDTφ) (B.17)
The definition for the local elasticity of substitution indicates DT =
d ln(D/T )
d ln(FD/FT )
. Because φ
exhibits constant returns to scale, we derive
DT =
φDφT
φDTφ
(B.18)
Above two equations imply that FDT > 0 if and only if 1/(1− α) > DT and FDT < 0 if and
only if 1/(1− α) < DT . Thus we can derive equation (13).
Proposition 1 implies that when copay for drug treatment decreases for a certain patient,
physician increase the quantity of prescription drugs for him, that is, dDi(kd)/dkd < 0. However,
the quantity of other health care could increase, decrease or stay the same, depending on the
relative size of “decreasing return” to scale (α) and elasticity of substitution between drug and
other services(DT ). For example, if DT < 1, two types of treatments are complementary in the
health production function, quantity of other services will increase as copay for prescription drugs
decreases. If DT > 1 and α < 1, there is enough substitutability between two treatments, the
quantity of other services will decrease.
Appendix C
Appendix Figures and Tables
Figure C.1: Any Prescription Drugs at Visit, NAMCS
Samples are based on data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (2002-2004 and 2006-2009)data.
The estimated discontinuities (and standard errors) at age 65 and the fitted lines are from a regression with a cubic
polynomial in age fully interacted with a dummy for age greater than or equal to 65 and a dummy for year in or
after 2006. Points represent means for people in each age cell (measured in quarters).
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Figure C.2: Number of Branded Drugs at Visit, NAMCS
Figure C.3: Number of OTC Drugs at Visit, NAMCS
Samples are based on data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (2002-2004 and 2006-2009)data.
The estimated discontinuities (and standard errors) at age 65 and the fitted lines are from a regression with a cubic
polynomial in age fully interacted with a dummy for age greater than or equal to 65 and a dummy for year in or
after 2006. Points represent means for people in each age cell (measured in quarters).
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Figure C.4: Total Number of Drugs at Visit, NAMCS
Figure C.5: Number of Tests at Visit, NAMCS
Samples are based on data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (2002-2004 and 2006-2009)data.
The estimated discontinuities (and standard errors) at age 65 and the fitted lines are from a regression with a cubic
polynomial in age fully interacted with a dummy for age greater than or equal to 65 and a dummy for year in or
after 2006. Points represent means for people in each age cell (measured in quarters).
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Figure C.6: Time with MD at Visit, NAMCS
Figure C.7: Age of Active Ingredients of Prescription Drugs, NAMCS
Samples are based on data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (2002-2004 and 2006-2009)data.
The estimated discontinuities (and standard errors) at age 65 and the fitted lines are from a regression with a cubic
polynomial in age fully interacted with a dummy for age greater than or equal to 65 and a dummy for year in or
after 2006. Points represent means for people in each age cell (measured in quarters).
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Table C.1: Summary of Utilization and Expenditure,NAMCS/MEPS/NIS-HCUP
Before 2006 After 2006
Below 65 Above 65 Below 65 Above 65
NAMCS data
Number of Rx Drugs 1.5995 1.7421 2.4978 2.6894
[0.049] [0.060] [0.067] [0.073]
Number of Generic Drugs 0.4676 0.5548 1.0071 1.1063
[0.025] [0.028] [0.034] [0.034]
Any Rx Drugs 0.5959 0.6199 0.7366 0.7443
[0.012] [0.014] [0.010] [0.010]
Number of Brand Name Drugs 1.1316 1.1874 1.4907 1.5831
[0.038] [0.044] [0.047] [0.051]
Number of OTC Drugs 0.3166 0.3524 0.425 0.42
[0.017] [0.019] [0.017] [0.017]
Number of Drugs 1.9878 2.1582 3.0136 3.2123
[0.060] [0.071] [0.078] [0.084]
Number of Diagnostic Tests 0.9726 0.9905 1.0951 1.0756
[0.026] [0.034] [0.020] [0.022]
Time Spent with MD 19.0852 18.2012 20.4644 20.3143
[0.394] [0.347] [0.285] [0.587]
Sample size 4857 4880 8589 8148
Age of Active Ingredient 163.2512 164.3038 209.0620 205.9645
[1.646] [1.614] [1.377] [1.171]
Sample size 6657 7317 20090 20068
MEPS data
Number of Prescriptions 21.2433 23.4335 22.0002 26.4892
[0.674] [0.662] [0.509] [0.772]
Expenditure for Prescriptions 1,556.62 1,687.74 1,688.55 2,074.38
[55.644] [48.229] [53.439] [80.166]
OOP Cost Per Script 26.3011 33.9963 19.7876 21.3611
[0.737] [0.810] [0.508] 1.000]
Rx Expenditure from Medicare 21.278 137.4626 167.8622 990.0724
[5.590] [17.196] [19.516] [47.770]
Rx Expenditure from Medicaid 153.2722 175.6891 113.3067 15.1114
[18.374] [18.767] [15.451] [2.914]
Rx Expenditure from Private 649.168 441.2063 824.9692 372.736
[29.370] [27.207] [45.240] [32.840]
Total Exp 6,577.93 7,361.14 7,135.29 7,318.92
[411.756] [351.460] [303.715] [235.426]
ER Exp 168.9881 172.838 217.3752 134.9842
[18.033] [38.645] [23.575] [14.162]
Inpatient Exp 2,199.66 2,597.48 1,917.99 1,987.40
[347.287] [269.855] [152.403] [136.954]
Outpatient Exp 643.12 756.6879 820.5137 609.0538
[40.900] [83.804] [113.207] [40.135]
Office Visit Exp 1,372.59 1,480.73 1,754.29 1,765.59
[76.368] [63.704] [88.539] [73.562]
Health Good 0.8881 0.8976 0.9001 0.9033
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
Sample size 3,897 3,075 5,650 4,309
1 All means and standard deviations are weighted statistics using survey instru-
ments
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Table C.1: Summary of Utilization and Expenditure,NAMCS/MEPS/NIS-HCUP (continued)
Before 2006 After 2006
Below 65 Above 65 Below 65 Above 65
NIS-HCUP data
Mortality 0.024 0.0277 0.0213 0.0247
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Length of Stay 5.3484 5.4869 5.3048 5.3595
[0.035] [0.033] [0.040] [0.037]
Total Charge 26,700.26 26,777.77 38,847.55 39,115.95
[478.396] [465.065] [796.325] [780.776]
Number of Procedures 1.8025 1.7743 2.0194 2.0148
[0.021] [0.021] [0.035] [0.033]
Diabetes Short-Term Complications 0.0024 0.0017 0.0025 0.0017
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Perforated Appendix 0.0044 0.0032 0.0051 0.0036
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000 ]
Diabetes Long-Term Complications 0.0141 0.0129 0.0138 0.0128
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
COPD or Asthma in Older Adults 0.0445 0.046 0.0377 0.0397
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Hypertension 0.0044 0.0042 0.005 0.0045
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Heart Failure 0.0412 0.0468 0.0343 0.0391
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Dehydration 0.0103 0.0106 0.0144 0.0144
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Bacterial Pneumonia 0.0314 0.0342 0.0276 0.0309
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Urinary Tract Infection 0.009 0.0102 0.0101 0.0117
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Angina without Procedure 0.0056 0.0048 0.0033 0.0028
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Uncontrolled Diabetes 0.0022 0.0019 0.002 0.0017
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Lower-Extremity Amputation Diabetes 0.0029 0.0028 0.0024 0.0022
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Any Avoidable Hospitalization 0.1711 0.1781 0.1571 0.164
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Sample size 1,209,946 1,343,435 962,385 1,009,566
1 All means and standard deviations are weighted statistics using survey instruments.
2 Standard deviations are in brackets.
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Table C.2: Summary Statistics for Independent Variables, NAMCS
Mean Std. Dev.
Patient Characteristics:
1(Age=65) 0.4984 [0.005]
Age 64.4111 [0.027]
Female 0.5608 [0.005]
Nonwhite 0.1365 [0.008]
Charlson Index=1 0.0683 [0.003]
Charlson Index=2 0.0561 [0.003]
Infectious and Parasitic Diseases 0.0128 [0.001]
Neoplasms 0.0544 [0.003]
Endocrine, Nutritional and Metabolic Diseases, and Immunity Disorders 0.0978 [0.004]
Diseases of The Blood and Blood-Forming Organs 0.0077 [0.001]
Mental Disorders 0.0303 [0.002]
Diseases of The Nervous System and Sense Organs 0.0967 [0.003]
Diseases of The Circulatory System 0.1459 [0.004]
Diseases of The Respiratory System 0.0787 [0.004]
Diseases of The Digestive System 0.0406 [0.002]
Diseases of The Genitourinary System 0.0468 [0.002]
Diseases of The Skin and Subcutaneous Tissue 0.0428 [0.002]
Diseases of The Musculoskeletal System and Connective Tissue 0.1068 [0.004]
Congenital Anomalies 0.0018 [0.000]
Symptoms, Signs, and Ill-Defined Conditions 0.068 [0.002]
Injury and Poisoning 0.1308 [0.005]
Visit Quarter==1 0.2407 [0.009]
Visit Quarter==2 0.2796 [0.010]
Visit Quarter==3 0.2424 [0.009]
Visit Quarter==4 0.2374 [0.008]
Physician Practice Characteristics:
MSA 0.8567 [0.032]
Solo Practice 0.3406 [0.013]
Electronic Medicaid Record 0.3308 [0.014]
General and Family Practice 0.2192 [0.010]
Internal Medicine 0.2156 [0.009]
Pediatrics 0.0048 [0.001]
General Surgery 0.0272 [0.002]
Obstetrics & Gynecology 0.0277 [0.002]
Orthopedic Surgery 0.0652 [0.005]
Cardiovascular Diseases 0.0542 [0.003]
Dermatology 0.0391 [0.003]
Urology 0.0356 [0.002]
Psychiatry 0.0195 [0.001]
Neurology 0.0142 [0.001]
Ophthalmology 0.0888 [0.004]
Otolaryngology 0.0184 [0.001]
Other specialties 0.1606 [0.008]
Oncologists 0.0079 [0.001]
Mid-level provider 0.002 [0.000]
Dummy (above median of prmcare=1) 0.6884 [0.011]
Sample Size 26,474
1 prmcare stands for precent of revenue from Medicare patients by physicians, missing values
are imputed using predicted value of tobit regression of prmcare on the year dummy, physician
specialty dummy, interaction between specialty dummy and percent of population over 65 years
old, interaction between specialty dummy and percent of patients over 65 years old by physicians,
whether physician use electronic medical records. Cutoff value for visit level analysis is 0.25, for
drug level analysis is 0.30.
2 All means and standard deviations are weighted statistics using survey instruments.
3 Standard deviations are in brackets.
APPENDIX C. APPENDIX FIGURES AND TABLES 122
Table C.3: Summary Statistics for Independent Variables, MEPS
Mean Std. Dev.
Female 0.5251 [0.004]
White 0.8500 [0.006]
Black 0.0949 [0.004]
Other Race 0.0551 [0.004]
Hispanic 0.0720 [0.004]
Poverty Category: Poor (Less Than 100%) 0.0862 [0.003]
Poverty Category: Near Poor (100% To Less Than 125%) 0.0410 [0.002]
Poverty Category: Low Income (125% To Less Than 200%) 0.1196 [0.004]
Poverty Category: Middle Income (200% To Less Than 400%) 0.2728 [0.006]
Poverty Category: High Income (Greater Than Or Equal To 400%) 0.4803 [0.007]
Census Region: Northeast 0.1947 [0.008]
Census Region: Midwest 0.2195 [0.009]
Census Region: South 0.3788 [0.010]
Census Region: West 0.2070 [0.008]
MSA 0.7911 [0.011]
Education Level: No Degree 0.1619 [0.004]
Education Level: High School 0.4934 [0.007]
Education Level: Bachelor Degree 0.1551 [0.005]
Education Level: Post Degree 0.1200 [0.005]
Education Level: Other Degree 0.0696 [0.004]
Marital Status: Married 0.6725 [0.007]
Marital Status: Widowed 0.1044 [0.004]
Marital Status: Divorced 0.1606 [0.004]
Marital Status: Separated 0.0168 [0.001]
Marital Status: Never Married 0.0456 [0.002]
Prior Condition: Diabetes 0.1782 [0.005]
Prior Condition: Asthma 0.0964 [0.003]
Prior Condition: High Blood Pressure 0.5422 [0.006]
Prior Condition: Angina 0.0525 [0.002]
Prior Condition: Heart Attack 0.0723 [0.003]
Prior Condition: Joint Pain 0.5193 [0.006]
Prior Condition: Stroke 0.0564 [0.003]
Prior Condition: Emphysema 0.0439 [0.002]
Prior Condition: Arthritis 0.4443 [0.006]
Prior Condition: Other Heart Condtions 0.1364 [0.004]
Observations 16,931
1 All means and standard deviations are weighted statistics using survey instruments.
2 Standard deviations are in brackets.
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Table C.4: Summary Statistics for Independent Variables, NIS-HCUP
Mean Std. Dev.
Female 0.5075 [0.001]
Admission During Weekends 0.1718 [0.001]
Emergency Room Admissions 0.5119 [0.006]
Transfer from Other Facilities 0.0609 [0.002]
Elective Admissions 0.2974 [0.004]
Hospital Bed Size: Medium 0.2387 [0.008]
Hospital Bed Size: Large 0.6386 [0.009]
Hospital Ownership: Government, Nonfederal, Public 0.0668 [0.005]
Hospital Ownership: Private, Non-Profit, Voluntary 0.2023 [0.008]
Hospital Ownership: Private, Invest-Own 0.1026 [0.005]
Hospital Ownership: Private, Collapsed Category 0.0387 [0.003]
Urban Hospital 0.8633 [0.005]
Teaching Hospital 0.4402 [0.011]
Zip Code Level Median Household Income Quartile==2 0.2547 [0.005]
Zip Code Level Median Household Income Quartile==3 0.2415 [0.004]
Zip Code Level Median Household Income Quartile==4 0.2578 [0.008]
Observations 4,525,332
1 All means and standard deviations are weighted statistics using survey instru-
ments.
2 Standard deviations are in brackets.
APPENDIX C. APPENDIX FIGURES AND TABLES 124
T
ab
le
C
.5
:
G
L
M
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
R
es
u
lt
s
fo
r
P
re
sc
ri
b
in
g
P
at
te
rn
,
N
A
M
C
S
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
P
re
sc
ri
p
ti
o
n
D
ru
g
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
G
en
er
ic
D
ru
g
A
n
y
P
re
sc
ri
p
-
ti
o
n
D
ru
g
s
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
B
ra
n
d
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
O
T
C
D
ru
g
s
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
D
ru
g
s
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
P
ro
ce
d
u
re
s
T
im
e
S
p
en
t
A
g
e
6
5
*
Y
ea
r
2
0
0
6
0
.3
1
7
7
*
*
0
.3
2
7
9
0
.1
2
0
5
0
.3
5
4
3
-0
.4
4
4
6
*
0
.1
8
4
6
-0
.0
7
2
8
0
.2
0
8
8
[0
.1
6
0
)
[0
.2
0
2
)
[0
.1
0
2
)
[0
.2
1
6
)
[0
.2
6
5
)
[0
.1
4
1
)
[0
.1
3
5
)
[0
.1
8
6
)
M
a
rg
in
a
l
E
ff
ec
ts
0
.6
8
0
7
0
.2
4
8
8
0
.0
8
2
2
0
.4
7
1
2
-0
.1
3
1
0
0
.4
6
8
8
-0
.0
5
0
7
4
.1
7
0
0
O
rd
er
o
f
P
o
ly
n
o
m
ia
l
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
A
g
e
6
5
*
Y
ea
r
2
0
0
6
0
.3
1
4
8
*
0
.3
7
3
9
-0
.0
2
2
9
0
.2
5
2
9
-0
.7
5
1
7
*
*
0
.1
0
2
1
0
.0
0
9
9
0
.3
5
3
7
[0
.1
8
9
]
[0
.2
7
0
]
[0
.1
2
4
]
[0
.2
7
0
]
[0
.3
6
3
]
[0
.1
6
9
]
[0
.1
6
3
]
[0
.3
6
8
]
M
a
rg
in
a
l
E
ff
ec
ts
0
.6
7
3
3
0
.2
8
6
1
-0
.0
1
5
2
0
.3
2
7
5
-0
.2
0
8
8
0
.2
5
4
1
0
.0
0
7
0
7
.2
7
3
3
O
rd
er
o
f
P
o
ly
n
o
m
ia
l
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
2
6
,4
7
4
2
6
,4
7
4
2
6
,4
7
4
2
6
,4
7
4
2
6
,4
7
4
2
6
,4
7
4
2
6
,4
7
4
2
6
,4
7
4
1
C
o
n
tr
o
l
va
ri
a
b
le
s
fo
r
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
d
u
m
m
y
o
f
y
ea
r
2
0
0
6
,
a
g
e
6
5
o
r
ov
er
,
p
o
ly
n
o
m
ia
l
co
n
tr
o
l
o
f
a
g
e
in
d
ay
s
a
n
d
th
ei
r
fu
ll
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
w
it
h
a
g
e
6
5
d
u
m
m
y
a
n
d
y
ea
r2
0
0
6
d
u
m
m
y,
p
a
ti
en
t
se
x
,
ra
ce
,
C
h
a
rl
so
n
in
d
ex
d
u
m
m
ie
s,
d
is
ea
se
ca
te
g
o
ry
b
y
p
ri
m
a
ry
d
ia
g
n
o
si
s
co
d
es
,
v
is
it
q
u
a
rt
er
,
p
h
y
si
ci
a
n
sp
ec
ia
lt
y
ty
p
e,
w
h
et
h
er
it
is
a
so
lo
p
ra
ct
ic
e
o
r
n
o
t,
el
ec
tr
o
n
ic
m
ed
ic
a
l
re
co
rd
s
u
ti
li
za
ti
o
n
,
M
S
A
st
a
tu
s
a
n
d
d
u
m
m
y
fo
r
re
v
en
u
e
fr
o
m
M
ed
ic
a
re
p
a
ti
en
ts
a
b
ov
e
m
ed
ia
n
.
2
R
es
u
lt
s
a
re
es
ti
m
a
te
d
u
si
n
g
su
rv
ey
G
L
M
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
w
it
h
G
a
u
ss
ia
n
fa
m
il
y
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
w
it
h
lo
g
li
n
k
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
in
b
ra
ck
et
s.
M
a
rg
in
a
l
eff
ec
ts
a
re
a
ls
o
li
st
ed
in
th
e
ta
b
le
.
3
*
*
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
th
e
1
%
le
v
el
(t
w
o
-t
a
il
te
st
);
*
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
th
e
5
%
le
v
el
(t
w
o
-t
a
il
te
st
);
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
le
v
el
(t
w
o
-t
a
il
te
st
).
APPENDIX C. APPENDIX FIGURES AND TABLES 125
T
ab
le
C
.6
:
T
w
o-
P
a
rt
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
R
es
u
lt
s
fo
r
U
ti
li
za
ti
on
an
d
E
x
p
en
d
it
u
re
of
P
re
sc
ri
p
ti
on
D
ru
g
s,
M
E
P
S
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
R
x
D
ru
g
s
E
x
p
fo
r
R
x
D
ru
g
s
O
O
P
co
st
p
er
sc
ri
p
t
R
x
E
x
p
fr
o
m
M
ed
ic
a
re
R
x
E
x
p
fr
o
m
M
ed
ic
a
id
R
x
E
x
p
fr
o
m
P
ri
-
va
te
P
a
rt
1
:
0
.0
2
0
2
-0
.0
5
5
5
0
.0
2
6
5
0
.5
5
9
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
5
2
-0
.3
7
8
1
*
*
*
A
g
e
6
5
*
Y
ea
r
2
0
0
6
[0
.0
5
8
]
[0
.0
3
7
]
[0
.0
6
0
]
[0
.0
6
4
]
[0
.0
3
1
]
[0
.0
8
3
]
P
a
rt
2
:
0
.3
3
6
8
*
0
.5
1
5
3
*
*
-0
.2
1
2
8
0
.0
2
5
4
-3
.0
6
0
5
*
*
*
-1
.4
0
3
0
*
*
*
A
g
e
6
5
*
Y
ea
r
2
0
0
6
[0
.2
0
0
]
[0
.2
3
1
]
[0
.1
7
3
]
[0
.9
3
5
]
[1
.1
3
8
]
[0
.4
6
8
]
M
a
rg
in
a
l
E
ff
ec
ts
4
.8
5
5
1
5
.8
2
-3
.4
5
3
1
6
7
7
.9
1
-2
2
4
0
3
.3
6
-3
9
0
.5
2
O
rd
er
o
f
P
o
ly
n
o
m
ia
l
1
1
1
1
1
1
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
1
6
,9
3
1
1
6
,9
3
1
1
6
,9
3
1
1
6
,9
3
1
1
6
,9
3
1
1
6
,9
3
1
1
C
o
n
tr
o
l
va
ri
a
b
le
s
fo
r
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
d
u
m
m
y
o
f
y
ea
r
2
0
0
6
,
a
g
e
6
5
o
r
ov
er
,
p
o
ly
n
o
m
ia
l
co
n
tr
o
l
o
f
a
g
e
in
d
ay
s
a
n
d
th
ei
r
fu
ll
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
w
it
h
a
g
e
6
5
d
u
m
m
y
a
n
d
y
ea
r2
0
0
6
d
u
m
m
y,
p
a
ti
en
t
se
x
(n
o
t
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
co
lu
m
n
3
a
n
d
4
),
ra
ce
,
p
ov
er
ty
ca
te
g
o
ri
es
(n
o
t
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
co
lu
m
n
5
-9
),
ce
n
su
s
re
g
io
n
d
u
m
m
ie
s,
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
le
v
el
ca
te
g
o
ri
ca
l
d
u
m
m
ie
s,
m
a
ri
ta
l
st
a
tu
s
d
u
m
m
ie
s,
p
ri
o
r
m
ed
ic
a
l
co
n
d
it
io
n
s
a
n
d
M
S
A
st
a
tu
s.
2
R
es
u
lt
s
a
re
es
ti
m
a
te
d
u
si
n
g
su
rv
ey
tw
o
-p
a
rt
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
w
it
h
lo
g
g
ed
se
co
n
d
p
a
rt
o
u
tc
o
m
es
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
in
b
ra
ck
et
s.
M
a
rg
in
a
l
eff
ec
ts
a
re
a
ls
o
li
st
ed
in
th
e
ta
b
le
.
3
*
*
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
th
e
1
%
le
v
el
(t
w
o
-t
a
il
te
st
);
*
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
th
e
5
%
le
v
el
(t
w
o
-t
a
il
te
st
);
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
le
v
el
(t
w
o
-t
a
il
te
st
).
APPENDIX C. APPENDIX FIGURES AND TABLES 126
T
ab
le
C
.7
:
T
w
o-
P
ar
t
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
R
es
u
lt
s
fo
r
O
th
er
M
ed
ic
al
E
x
p
en
d
it
u
re
,
M
E
P
S
T
o
ta
l
E
x
p
E
R
E
x
p
In
p
a
ti
en
t
E
x
p
O
u
tp
a
ti
en
t
E
x
p
O
ffi
ce
V
is
it
E
x
p
P
a
rt
1
:
A
g
e
6
5
*
Y
ea
r
2
0
0
6
-0
.0
5
5
5
0
.0
6
8
5
0
.0
0
2
2
0
.0
9
4
8
0
.0
5
6
6
[0
.0
3
7
]
[0
.0
5
5
]
[0
.0
5
2
]
[0
.0
7
7
]
[0
.0
6
0
]
P
a
rt
2
:
A
g
e
6
5
*
Y
ea
r
2
0
0
6
0
.5
1
5
3
*
*
-0
.3
0
5
1
0
.6
3
4
6
0
.1
7
7
5
0
.1
7
3
1
[0
.2
3
1
]
[0
.5
5
5
]
[0
.6
2
2
]
[0
.4
6
3
]
[0
.2
5
7
]
M
a
rg
in
a
l
E
ff
ec
ts
4
2
0
1
.0
7
7
3
.7
7
3
8
9
.5
4
4
5
6
.0
9
3
3
8
.6
7
O
rd
er
o
f
P
o
ly
n
o
m
ia
l
1
1
1
1
1
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
1
6
,9
3
1
1
6
,9
3
1
1
6
,9
3
1
1
6
,9
3
1
1
6
,9
3
1
1
C
o
n
tr
o
l
va
ri
a
b
le
s
fo
r
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
d
u
m
m
y
o
f
y
ea
r
2
0
0
6
,
a
g
e
6
5
o
r
ov
er
,
p
o
ly
n
o
m
ia
l
co
n
tr
o
l
o
f
a
g
e
in
d
ay
s
a
n
d
th
ei
r
fu
ll
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
w
it
h
a
g
e
6
5
d
u
m
m
y
a
n
d
y
ea
r2
0
0
6
d
u
m
m
y,
p
a
ti
en
t
se
x
(n
o
t
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
co
lu
m
n
3
a
n
d
4
),
ra
ce
,
p
ov
er
ty
ca
te
g
o
ri
es
(n
o
t
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
co
lu
m
n
5
-9
),
ce
n
su
s
re
g
io
n
d
u
m
m
ie
s,
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
le
v
el
ca
te
g
o
ri
ca
l
d
u
m
m
ie
s,
m
a
ri
ta
l
st
a
tu
s
d
u
m
m
ie
s,
p
ri
o
r
m
ed
ic
a
l
co
n
d
it
io
n
s
a
n
d
M
S
A
st
a
tu
s.
2
R
es
u
lt
s
a
re
es
ti
m
a
te
d
u
si
n
g
su
rv
ey
tw
o
-p
a
rt
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
w
it
h
lo
g
g
ed
se
co
n
d
p
a
rt
o
u
tc
o
m
es
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
in
b
ra
ck
et
s.
M
a
rg
in
a
l
eff
ec
ts
a
re
a
ls
o
li
st
ed
in
th
e
ta
b
le
.
3
*
*
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
th
e
1
%
le
v
el
(t
w
o
-t
a
il
te
st
);
*
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
th
e
5
%
le
v
el
(t
w
o
-t
a
il
te
st
);
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
le
v
el
(t
w
o
-t
a
il
te
st
).
APPENDIX C. APPENDIX FIGURES AND TABLES 127
Table C.8: Variation of State-Level Medicaid Managed Care Penetration Rate, NIS
State Abbreviation Mean Std. Dev.
AK 0.0000 [0.000]
AL 0.6115 [0.057]
AR 0.7036 [0.097]
AZ 0.9082 [0.021]
CA 0.5142 [0.014]
CO 0.9405 [0.020]
CT 0.7247 [0.038]
DC 0.6963 [0.123]
DE 0.7678 [0.037]
FL 0.6386 [0.041]
GA 0.8587 [0.102]
HI 0.8378 [0.087]
IA 0.8566 [0.041]
ID 0.6522 [0.222]
IL 0.2393 [0.209]
IN 0.7004 [0.031]
KS 0.6263 [0.140]
KY 0.8317 [0.114]
LA 0.4889 [0.297]
MA 0.6114 [0.032]
MD 0.7143 [0.041]
ME 0.5309 [0.161]
MI 0.9225 [0.081]
MN 0.6416 [0.024]
MO 0.6133 [0.259]
MS 0.3606 [0.300]
MT 0.6582 [0.139]
NC 0.7121 [0.061]
ND 0.5922 [0.038]
NE 0.7743 [0.050]
NH 0.2633 [0.332]
NJ 0.6732 [0.049]
NM 0.6627 [0.044]
NV 0.6317 [0.224]
NY 0.5493 [0.155]
OH 0.3499 [0.162]
OK 0.7530 [0.109]
OR 0.8800 [0.058]
PA 0.8037 [0.038]
RI 0.6687 [0.027]
SC 0.3647 [0.399]
SD 0.9282 [0.089]
TN 1.0000 [0.000]
TX 0.4994 [0.151]
UT 0.8806 [0.035]
VA 0.6097 [0.045]
VT 0.6666 [0.130]
WA 0.9156 [0.055]
WI 0.5125 [0.063]
WV 0.4561 [0.036]
WY 0.0000 [0.000]
1 Standard deviations are in brackets.
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